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Abstract
This paper models the strategic encounter of two o¢ ce-motivated candidates who may or may
not announce policy. In the case of no announcement, the voters rank the candidates according
to prior beliefs. In the case of announcement, the candidates cannot avoid a degree of noise in
the votersinterpretation of their announcements. We show that this simple deviation from the
standard Downsian setting su¢ ces to overcome previous impossibility results which suggest that
not announcing policy can never occur in equilibrium.
Also, we extend the model to study the equilibrium when candidates are ambiguity averse. An
ambiguity averse candidate is interpreted as being concerned about an ongoing negative campaign
against him. This negative campaign would consist in inducing the voters to adopt some inter-
pretation of the candidates announcement unfavorable to his electoral performance. We show
that under ambiguity aversion the candidates opt not to announce position under less stringent
conditions than expected utility.
Finally, we use data on U.S. Senate elections to test an empirical implication of the model.
We nd that the relevant coe¢ cient has the sign predicted by the theory and is statistically
signicant.
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1 Introduction
Not announcing a position on sensitive issues is a common practice of candidates across elections. In
the presidential campaign of 2004, for instance, the phenomenon was so evident that the New York
Times devoted a series of editorials to bring up "the toughest challenges facing the country" that
were either "being glossed over with one-liners" or "not being mentioned" by candidates.1 The two
most striking issues were the federal budget decit and agricultural subsidies.
In this paper, we address the following questions: Why are some important issues never discussed
in an election? Why are some other less sensitive issues often discussed? In democracies, elections
are the means by which citizenspreferences are translated into policy outcomes. The disregard of
sensitive issues by candidates during political contests then undermines the e¢ cacy of democracy
in achieving its main goal: being the government by the people. Furthermore, if the disregard of
the parties for certain issues is persistent over time, polities may enter into a "political trap" in
which highly unpopular policies continue to be executed by politicians just because the voters lack
the chance to vote them out. For example, consider the failure of the candidates to discuss the
budget decit in the presidential campaign of 2004. Given this fact, to what extent does the current
budget decit reect a popular choice, no matter how distorted? How large are the welfare losses
from having a budget decit other than the socially desired one? How will society deal with the
issue if the parties opt not to discuss it again in the next election? These rhetorical questions point
out potentially deleterious e¤ects of political non-salience. In this paper, by salience we mean the
phenomenon that both candidates opt to announce a position, and by non-salience we mean the
phenomenon that at least one of the candidates in an election opts not to announce a position on
some issue.
This research has been beneted from comments and discussion from Enriqueta Aragonès, Marcus Berliant, Michele
Boldrin, Randall Calvert, Hideo Konishi, Amanda Friedenberg, Edward Greenberg, Gary Miller, Ignacio Monzon,
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Paul Rothstein, Norman Schoeld and Robert W. Walker. I especially thank my advisors,
Marcus Berliant and Norman Schoeld, for their constant support. All errors remain my own.
yDepartment of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1208, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis,
MO 63130-4899 USA. Email: gcataife@artsci.wustl.edu.
1http://www.nytimes.com/ref/opinion/campaign-issues.html?pagewanted=all
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Several prominent scholars, including Downs (1957), Shepsle (1972), and Page (1976), pointed
out the relevance of this problem a long time ago. Yet, the incentives of the candidates not to
discuss relevant issues are not well understood. In fact, rational choice theory has provided strong
negative results for this phenomenon. Recently, Berliant and Konishi (2005) proved that, under very
mild assumptions, non-salience cannot happen in a robust equilibrium within the standard expected
utility framework. In their model, two o¢ ce-motivated candidates may announce or not announce
policy. The candidates are uncertain regarding the most preferred policy of the voters. In case a
candidate does not announce, the voters rank the candidate according to their prior beliefs regarding
the policy to be implemented by the candidate if he wins the election. In this setting, risk aversion
on the part of the voters su¢ ces to guarantee that, in equilibrium, the candidates will always prefer
to announce policy. The authors further suggest that robust non-salience may be obtained if one
abandoned the expected utility framework in favor of the ambiguity aversion framework.
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the conditions under which o¢ ce-motivated candi-
dates may have incentives not to announce positions. This paper shows that only minor modications
to the standard Downsian model are required to generate non-salience in equilibrium. We consider
this a contribution to the literature on political ambiguity, since, to the best of our knowledge, there
is no paper to date that generates ambiguity within a simple framework or without reverting to
strong assumptions. In the next paragraphs we discuss the assumptions made throughout.
The rst premise is that we assume a one-dimensional polity, where two o¢ ce-motivated can-
didates know the distribution of votersideal points with certainty. Since our main objective is to
show that, contrary to what previous impossibility results have suggested, non-salience can indeed
be obtained in equilibrium, a one-dimensional proof makes our main point. Besides, for our results
to be strong, we need to show that non-salience can be obtained even in the presence of Condorcet
(or "unbeaten") points. Because multi-dimensional models usually present Condorcet cycles, even if
we provided a multi-dimensional model, the most exigent test for the model would be to hold in the
particular case of one dimension. Examples of one-dimensional models are abundant in the litera-
ture on spatial voting. See Osborne (2000), Morelli (2004), and, in the specic area of ambiguity in
elections, see Aragones and Postlewaite (2000).
The second and most important premise of our research is that the candidates cannot avoid a
certain degree of noise in the votersinterpretation of their announcements. In the real world, we
identify two main sources of noise in the interpretation of announcements. The rst one is language,
which is an ambiguous means of communication. The seminal work in this area has been written by
the semiotician Ferdinand Saussure (1986), who investigated the miscommunication problems gener-
ated by language mainly by elaborating on the dichotomy signied (signié) / signier (signiant).2
The second source of noise is the intermediation of third parties between politicians and voters. An
obvious example would be the mass media (see Ansolabehere et al., 1993). We refer to the voters
noisy signal of the announcement by a candidate as the interpretation (of the announcement).
If a candidate does not announce policy, the voters use their beliefs about the policy that he/she
will implement. On the other hand, if a candidate does announce policy, the voters expect the
candidate to implement their interpretation of his announcement. We consider this assumption the
equivalent, within our model, to the standard assumption of the literature that the candidates commit
2We nd it surprising that his work remains unexplored by economists, since it has impacted the ideas of leading
scholars in several other disciplines, including philosophy, psychoanalysis and anthropology.
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to implement their announcements. The usual justication for this assumption is that politicians
that renege their promises are likely to be punished in future elections. Importantly, we understand
that the assumption that the voters expect the candidates to implement the interpretation of their
announcements is the only compatible with the premise of political accountability. If, for example,
we assumed that the voters expect the winner to implement a policy randomly drawn among all the
possible interpretations of his announcement, then the candidates could not be made accountable for
the implementation of any specic policy. (The severity of this problem increases with the number
of possible interpretations of the announcement.) Clearly, the lack of accountability undermines the
very nature of a representative government, since the votes themselves no longer reect support to
any specic platform. For this reason, we suggest that the votersexpectation that the candidates
will implement the interpretations of their announcements may be considered as a "focal" point, i.e.,
as an institutional arrangement made between politicians and voters in order to make democracy
viable in a context of noisy announcements. Our last remark regarding this assumption is that, were
we to assume instead, voters expect the candidates to randomize among the possible interpretations,
the results would be as follows. Within expected utility, non-salience would only hold if we made
the stronger assumptions that voters are risk averse and the variance of the lottery from which the
policy implemented by a winner that did not announce is drawn is higher than the variance of the
lottery from which the interpretation of the announcements is drawn. However, within the ambiguity
aversion framework, similar results would apply.
The third premise is that, rather than maximizing probability of winning, the candidates maxi-
mize expected vote share. This assumption is very frequent in the literature; for example, see Adams
(1999), Lin et al. (1999), and Schoeld (2006). (For a discussion on the equivalence of the assump-
tions of maximizing probability of winning and maximizing vote share with probabilistic voters, see
Patty, 2007). However, some scholars consider that maximization of probability of winning is a more
appropriate assumption than maximization of vote share. In any case, we remark that non-salience
can also be generated in this model under the assumption that the candidates maximize expected
probability of winning.3 We do not adopt the latter assumption throughout for two reasons. First,
the minimum number of possible interpretations of the candidatesannouncements required to ob-
tain an equilibrium in which both candidates do not announce position increases from two (under
the assumption of maximization of expected vote share) to three (under the assumption of maxi-
mization of probability of winning), complicating the model substantively. Second, the assumption
that the candidates maximize expected vote share simplies the extension of the model that assumes
ambiguity averse candidates.
The main result of our paper is that non-salience may occur in equilibrium, under certain values
of the parameters, for any distribution of voters ideal points. As a general principle, in order to
generate non-salience, it is required that we either x the mean of the votersbeliefs and increase
the noise that enters in the votersinterpretation of the announcements or x the magnitude of this
noise and make the mean of the votersbeliefs close enough to the electoral center. The intuition
for this result is that if the mean of the beliefs is close enough to the median ideal point, then not
announcing policy gives the candidates a vote share close to the optimum in the absence of noise
and, at the same time, provides to them a means to circumvent the noise in their announcements.
The assumption that there are several possible interpretations of the announcements made by the
3This point is discussed in Section V.
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candidates allows us to pursue the following natural extension of the model. A plausible concern of
the candidates may be that some external agent, perhaps his opponent or the mass media, attempts
to induce, among the several possible interpretations, one that is unfavorable to him. The reason that
the candidates may be concerned about the possibility that their opponents attempt to manipulate
the interpretations in an unfavorable manner is that elections are zero-sum games. The reason
that they may be concerned about the possibility that the mass media attempt to manipulate the
interpretations in an unfavorable manner is that the media may have interests di¤erent than reporting
facts objectively (see Ansolabehere et al., 1993).
However, the mere fact that the media can potentially bias the candidatesmessage to the voters
does not necessarily imply that there actually is such a media bias. Whether or not such a bias
exists is an empirical question, and there is no consensus in the literature on this issue. On one
hand, mass media experts have encountered empirical evidence that although people are convinced
of the existence of media bias, there is no such bias (DAlessio and Allen 2000, Shah et al. 1999,
Robinson and Sheenan 1983). Importantly, this literature has encountered what it has termed the
hostile media e¤ect : although there is no media bias, individuals rmly believe there is such a
bias and, furthermore, that its direction is against their viewpoints (Dalton et al., 1998, Vallone
et al., 1985). On the other hand, a recent study by two economists (Groseclose and Milyo, 2005)
nds signicant evidence of media bias. Note that both bodies of literature support the idea that
people in general may be concerned about the possibility that the media alter their messages in an
unfavorable manner. The following quotation by former Democratic presidential candidate Michael
Dukakis, in which he explains his defeat in the 1988 election, provides evidence that the hostile media
e¤ect is present, in particular, among political candidates, and plays a role in shaping their political
strategies.
"I said in my acceptance speech at Atlanta that the 1988 election was not about
ideology but about competence. I was wrong. It was about phraseology. It was about
10-second sound bites. And made-for-TV backdrops. And going negative. I made a lot
of mistakes in the 88 campaign, but none was as damaging as my failure to understand
this phenomenon, and the need to respond immediately and e¤ectively to distortions of
ones record and ones positions"4
We pursue an extension of the model that accounts for the phenomenon of hostile media e¤ect.
This is done through abandoning the expected utility framework in favor of ambiguity aversion.
Recall that in the specialized literature, it is customary to see ambiguity averse agents as acting as if
"out there" there were a malevolent third party playing a zero-sum game against them (Maccheroni
et al., 2006a). Therefore, once we assume the candidates are ambiguity averse, it follows that each
of them acts as if there were a malevolent inuence, presumably his opponent or the mass media,
playing against him, by inducing an unfavorable interpretation of their announcements.
Two groups of papers may be distinguished for the purpose of describing where our model ts
in the literature. The rst group addresses the problem of ambiguity, rather than salience properly
speaking, because candidates are allowed to announce lotteries. Hence, this body of literature explains
why candidates may prefer to announce many (instead of any) positions on certain issues. Shepsle
(1972), the seminal paper within this group, nds that in order to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium,
4Extracted from Johnson-Cartee and Copeland (1997). Original quotation in Buttereld (1990).
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voters need to be risk lovers. Since the assumption of risk-loving voters is controversial, this result
has motivated further research by social choice scholars. Since Alesina and Cukierman (1990) also
include a noise term in their model, we wish to make clear that their model is very di¤erent from
ours. In particular, in their model, a necessary condition to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium is that
candidates have policy preferences. In our model, candidates are strictly o¢ ce-motivated. Another
necessary condition in their model is that candidates aim to run for re-election, and hence the dynamic
nature of their model. Our model is static, and hence re-electoral concerns are implausible. Also,
in their model, candidates can choose the magnitude of noise, and, in equilibrium, this magnitude
is set at levels higher than zero. In our model, if candidates could choose the magnitude of noise in
the interpretation of their announcements, they would set it at zero (assuming risk averse voters).
In Aragones and Neeman (2000), the candidates are assumed to (i) have preferences over policy
(ii) not commit to implement their promises and (iii) be concerned about their probability of re-
election. They show that for su¢ ciently large degrees of uncertainty on the part of the candidates
regarding the distribution of votersideal points, ambiguity occurs in equilibrium. As in Alesina and
Cukierman (1990), in Aragones and Neeman (2000), ambiguity decreases the candidatesprobability
of winning o¢ ce, and it is driven by the assumption that candidates care about policy. Aragones
and Postlewaite (2002) assume that the candidates only care about o¢ ce; in their setting, candidates
cannot guarantee voters that their promises will be honored.
The second group of papers addresses the problem of salience properly speaking. Instead of allow-
ing the candidates to announce any possible lottery, this group of papers gives them the candidates
the option of not announcing any position. Therefore, candidates can announce any position in the
policy space or not announce a position at all. Following the Downsian setting, candidates commit
to implement their promises if any was made; otherwise, votersuse their beliefs regarding the policy
that will be implemented by a winner that did not announce policy. Berliant and Konishi (2005)
add uncertainty on the part of the candidates regarding the distribution of votersmost preferred
policies, and prove that non-salience can never be a robust equilibrium. Since in their model it is just
assumed that candidates are expected utility maximizers and voters are risk neutral or risk averse,
their impossibility results constitute a substantial challenge to the literature. We wish to make clear
the point that, although they assume that candidates maximize probability of winning, their results
also hold when candidates maximize vote share. The reason is that the key to their results is that
elections are zero-sum game (which is true under both premises). A formal proof follows readily from
both Proposition 8 and Proposition 12 in the main body of this paper.
Berliant and Konishi (2005) seemingly contradict Glazer (1999), who o¤ers an informal model
in which candidates prefer not to announce policy. However, this seeming contradiction is resolved
when one makes explicit the implicit assumption in Glazer (1999) that the candidates do not know
the mean of the votersbeliefs regarding the policy that will be implemented by a winner that did not
announce. The main problem with this assumption is that it violates the standard game theoretic
postulate that the structure of the game is common knowledge (Aumann, 1976). Berliant and Konishi
(2005) suggest that ambiguity aversion may be necessary to generate an equilibrium where at least
some candidate does not announce a position. Our model distances itself from theirs in that, by
introducing a slight deviation from the standard Downsian setting, it does succeed in generating such
an equilibrium, even within expected utility. Aragones et al. (2007) study a repeated election model
in which strictly policy-motivated candidates have the option of not announcing policy. However,
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their focus is not on generating non-salience, but in analyzing equilibria in which the voters threat
to punish candidates who renege on their campaign promises and in which all campaign promises
are believed by voters and honored by candidates.
The impossibility results of Berliant and Konishi (2005) may explain why the papers on ambiguity
have signicantly outnumbered the papers on salience proper, especially since the latter are more
parsimonious. However, our paper, which models salience proper, nds that the impossibility results
may be overcome by just introducing a simple and not unreasonable assumption. Previous results
in the literature have generated ambiguity by assuming: risk lover voters (Shepsle, 1972), absence of
common knowledge (Glazer, 1990), inability of the candidates to commit to implement their promises
(Aragones and Postlewaite, 2002). Our results are encouraging, since our model has been able to
generate both partial non-salience and non-salience by slightly deviating from the standard Downsian
setting. It su¢ ces to assume that the interpretation of announcements depends on the state of the
world.
Finally, two papers which do not address the problem of salience or ambiguity but are, nonethe-
less, related to our paper are Ghirardato and Katz (2002) and, especially, Bade (2003). These
two papers, as well as Berliant and Konishi (2005), share the common feature with our paper of
introducing ambiguity aversion in the study of elections. Ghirardato and Katz (2002) apply am-
biguity aversion in order to explain why voters may abstain, even when voting is assumed to be
costless. Bade (2003) introduces ambiguity aversion à la Gilboa-Schmeidler to generate equilibrium
in multi-dimensional political contests.
A direct implication of the propositions obtained in this paper is that non-salience (at least one
candidate opts not to announce a position) can be obtained in equilibrium if the mean of the voters
beliefs is close enough to the Condorcet winner in the standard Downsian game. The intuition for
this result is as follows. Assume that a candidate, say 1, does not announce a position. Candidate
2s opportunity cost of responding with a no-announcement increases with the distance between
the voters beliefs (about the policy that will be implemented by a candidate that won without
announcing policy) and the Condorcet winner. To see this, note that given the spatial nature of the
game, the less centrist the voters believe candidate 1s implemented policy will be, the larger the vote
share candidate 2 could achieve by implementing a response which is epsilon away from candidate 1s
implicit policy position. Being epsilon closer to the Condorcet winner, candidate 2s announcement
could restrict candidate 1s appeal to the disa¤ected voters in an extreme of the votersdistribution,
irrespective of the state of the world. Therefore, there must be a point such that if the distance
between the votersbeliefs and the Condorcet winner is smaller than the distance between that point
and the Condorcet winner, the cost of alienating some voters is smaller than the "cost" of announcing
a "noisy" interpretation.5
Since it plays an important role in generating the results, we give some intuition on why the noise
that enters in the interpretation of the announcements decreases the candidatesexpected utility of
announcing policy. Consider the following example. Suppose that: (i) the policy space is [0; 1]; (ii)
the voters distribute uniformly over the policy space, (iii) the noise term entering additively in the
5The fact that we model non-salience (and not ambiguity) implies that, if the candidates decide not to announce,
they are assigned a position (or, more precisely, a lottery) by default. Moreover, the candidates have no say over this
lottery. Hence, there is no simple way to extend the model in order to obtain that, in equilibrium, candidates prefer
not announce position for extreme values of  but not for central values of . We believe that this is nice feature of the
model, since it o¤ers a testable implication which is robust to any small perturbation of the model.
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votersinterpretation of the announcement made by candidate 2 is 0:1, (iv) there is no noise entering
in the voters interpretation of the announcement made by candidate 1, (v) the two possible states
of the world occur with probability 12 each. Also, x candidate 1s announcement: d1 = 0:2. In the
standard Downsian model (where interpretations and announcements are identical), assuming that
the payo¤s of the candidates are given by their expected vote share, the best response of candidate 2
is to announce d2 = 0:2+ ;6 which gives candidate 2 a payo¤ of 0:8. However, in the model in which
candidate 2s interpretation is noisy, d2 = 0:2+ , gives candidate 2 a payo¤ of
0:2+(0:2+ 0:1)
2 ! 0:15
with probability 12 ,
7 and a payo¤ of 1  0:2+(0:2++0:1)2 ! 0:75 with probability 12 , which implies that
candidate 2s expected payo¤ is 12 (0:15)+
1
2 (0:75) = 0:45: Note that candidate 2s expected utility is
lower in the noisy model for a xed response. But, of course, d2 = 0:2 +  need not be candidate 2s
best response to d1 = 0:2: Indeed, in Appendix A we show that the best response of candidate 2 in
this case is d2 = 0:2+ 0:1+ : In this case, candidate 2s gets a payo¤ of 1  0:2+(0:2+0:1+ 0:1)2 ! 0:8
with probability 12 and a payo¤ of 1  0:2+(0:2+0:1++0:1)2 ! 0:7 with probability 12 , which implies an
expected payo¤ of 12 (0:8) +
1
2 (0:7) = 0:75: This example illustrates that, conditional on playing his
best response, a candidate whose interpretation is subject to some noise pays a (utility) premium
of 12 times the magnitude of the noise entering in the voters interpretation of the announcement
namely: 12(0:1) = 0:05. The greater the magnitude of this noise, the higher the premium paid in
expectation by the candidate is. Now, assume that, instead of announcing d1 = 0:2; candidate 1
declares ;, which stands for no-announcement. Also, assume that the mean of the votersbeliefs
regarding the policy that will be implemented by a winner that did not announce policy is  = 0:2.
If, for expositional clarity, we assume that the voters are risk neutral, this example and the previous
one, in which d1 = 0:2, are obviously equivalent. Note that, if candidate 2 wants to avoid paying
the expected utility premium associated to announcing a position, which we said sums up to 12(0:1),
there is only one strategy he can play. In this model (unlike in the standard Downsian setting),
announcing the same strategy as the opponentsone does not guarantee an expected vote share of 12 ,
since the interpretation of the announcements may be di¤erent even when the strategies are identical.
However, if both candidates declare ;, there is no announcement, there is no noise and, henceforth,
the candidates have identical appeal to each and every voter, implying that the expected vote share
is 12 for each of them. To sum up, candidate 2 may avoid paying the utility premium generated by the
noise in the interpretation of his announcement only if he declares ;: From candidate 2s perspective,
this choice has the drawback that it deprives him of the opportunity of taking advantage of the fact
that his opponent, candidate 1, has adopted an implicit position which is extreme (namely: 0:2), and
therefore unappealing to the bulk of the voters.8 Because this second example is equivalent to the rst
one, it follows that the best candidate 2 can do announcing policy is to announce d2 = 0:2+ 0:1+ ;
which gives him an expected utility of 0:75; which is higher than the expected utility of responding
with a no-announcement, namely 12 : If, instead, the mean of the voters beliefs were, say, 0:47,
instead of 0:2, then the best candidate 2 can do conditional on announcing policy is to announce
6As we already remarked, strictly speaking, in the standard Downsian model there is no best response to any position
other than the median. However, this is not really a problem, since we can always use the concept of "-equilibrium.
The latter only requires that no player can gain more than " in expected utility by deviating from his strategy, given
the strategy of his opponent.
7Recall that voters distribute uniformly over [0; 1].
8To see this, note that because candidate 1 declared ;; by risk neutrality the voters associated him with the mean
of their beliefs, namely 0:2, which is far away from the median, namely 0:5:
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d2 = 0:47 + 0:1 + : In this case, candidate 2s gets a payo¤ of 1   0:47+(0:47+0:1+ 0:1)2 ! 0:53 with
probability 12 and a payo¤ of 1   0:47+(0:47+0:1++0:1)2 ! 0:43 with probability 12 , which implies an
expected payo¤ of 12 (0:53) +
1
2 (0:43) = 0:48; which is lower than the expected utility of responding
with a no-announcement, namely 12 : In this case not announcing policy is candidate 1s best response.
This discussion makes evident that, in order to obtain non-salience, we can either x the mean of
the votersbeliefs and increase the noise that enters in the votersinterpretation of the announcements
or x the magnitude of this noise and make the mean of the votersbeliefs closer and closer to the
electoral center. In the main body of the paper, we show that there is a certain threshold for the
mean of the votersbeliefs for which candidate 2s incentive to deviate from ; in order to capture the
votes of the electoral center is high enough to overcome the cost generated by announcing a position.
The example above gives some intuition as to why candidates that behave like simple expected
utility maximizers may opt not to announce a position in a model that slightly deviates from the
standard Downsian setting. The key to our results is that this slight modication induces a cost of
announcing position, in expected utility terms, which is proportional to the magnitude of the noise
entering in the interpretation of the announcements.
When we introduce ambiguity aversion, the results are stronger, in the sense that the conditions
under which candidates prefer not to announce policy are less stringent. To see why, note that
within the ambiguity aversion framework, the candidates are endowed with multiple beliefs, which
in this case translates into multiple beliefs regarding the probability distributions of the states of the
world. For example, consider the extreme case in which the candidates believe that any conceivable
probability distribution of the states of the world is possible. Since this includes the degenerate
probabilities (in which one state occurs with probability 1 and the other with probability 0), it
follows readily that an ambiguity averse candidate will act as if, with probability 1, Nature will
pick the most unfavorable scenario for him.9 Hence, in terms of the second example above, the
(maximin) expected payo¤ of candidate 2 becomes 0 (0:53) + 1 (0:43) = 0:43 instead of 0:48. Then,
not announcing position becomes candidate 2s best response for a larger set of values of the mean of
the votersbeliefs. We wish to make clear that this example is simply to anticipate some intuition,
and that the actual ambiguity aversion framework adopted in this paper, variational preferences
(Maccheroni et al., 2006a), is much richer, realistic and better accommodates the interpretation of
the model.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, there is no paper in the literature that o¤ers an empirical
study of the phenomenon of ambiguity or salience in the election context. A nice, distinguishing,
feature of our model is that it generates a testable implication. We carry out an empirical analysis of
this testable implication, centered on U.S. Senate elections. First, we suggest that, under reasonable
premises (discussed in Section VI), a sensible measure of the cost of reducing the noise in the
votersinterpretation of the announcements by the candidates is given by the cost of airing political
advertising on TV in the particular state the candidate is running for Senator. Second, we suggest
that the passed/failed result of the National Political Awareness Test, conducted on each U.S. Senate
candidate by Project Vote Smart is a good proxy of whether or not the candidates announced
positions. Then, we run a probit model to test the relationship between the cost of reducing the
noise in the votersinterpretation of the announcements and the probability of announcing position.
Our empirical analysis shows that, ceteris paribus, the higher the cost of TV advertising in a political
9We are implicitly assuming that every probability distribution can be induced by Nature at the same cost.
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district, the lower the probability that the candidate will announce position. This relationship is
found to be statistically signicant at the 5% level, and robust to several minor modications of the
empirical model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we outline the model (within
the expected utility framework). Section III discusses the problem of the voters. Section IV discusses
the problem of the candidates and states the main results. Section V discusses two extensions of
the model within expected utility: two-candidate competition assuming maximization of expected
probability of winning (instead of maximization of expected vote share) and multi-candidate com-
petition. Section VI studies the problem under a behavioral assumption di¤erent from expected
utility, namely ambiguity aversion, in order to account for the phenomenon of negative campaigning.
Section VII tests an empirical implication of our model. Section VIII concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a one-issue, simultaneous-move political contest with two candidates, who have the objective
of maximizing expected vote share. The candidates are assumed to know the distribution of voters
most preferred policies with certainty. The declaration of a platform by a candidate can either
(i) contain the announcement of a position in the policy space, or (ii) be empty, representing no-
announcement. Note that we are using the term "declare a platform" to denote either an empty
announcement or a non-empty announcement, and keeping the term "announcement" to refer to a
non-empty announcement.
The distinguishing feature of this model is that the voters receive a noisy signal of the announce-
ments, which we call the interpretation (of the announcement). This signal is assumed to be the
same for all the voters. Di¤erent realizations of the noise represent di¤erent states of the world.
(Intuitively, the magnitude of the noise entering in the interpretation depends on the technology of
communication available to the candidates.) Candidates are committed to execute the interpretation
of their announced policy. In case the platform is empty, the voters assume that the candidate will
implement a policy that will be randomly drawn from a known distribution. For simplicity, this
distribution is assumed to be the same for both candidates.
To simplify the analysis, we make the following assumptions. First, the noise can only take two
di¤erent values. One value represents a leftist bias, and the other a rightist bias.10 Second, the
technology of communication is neutral, in the sense that the rightist and the leftist biases have
equal probability. Third, the bias in the voters interpretation of candidate 1s announcement is
drawn independently to the bias in the voters interpretation of candidate 2s announcement.
At this point, some minimal notation needs to be introduced. We let c index candidates 1 and
2: We use D [ f;g to denote the policy space of the candidates, where D is a compact interval and
; denotes a no-announcement. There is a set of states of the world, S  S1  S2; with elements
denoted by s  (s1; s2). For c 2 f1; 2g; sc, represents the bias in the interpretation of candidate
cs announcement. There are two possible biases: leftist and rightist. Then, s 2 S represents any
possible combination of biases for the candidates.11 We let the scalar c(s) denote the noise that
10For example: a candidate announces policy a and the votersinterpretation is either a+  or a  , where  is any
(small and positive) scalar.
11We refer to any subset of S as an event. We let  denote an algebra of events and () the set of all nitely
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enters in the voters interpretation of candidate cs announcement conditional on the state of the
world s:
For the sake of exposition, we proceed to dene four models that will be used throughout.
Denition 1 Model M(D[f;g; 1(s); 2(s)). The strategy space is D[f;g; candidates 1 and 2 face
noises 1(s) and 2(s), respectively, conditional to the state of the world s:
M(D[f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) is the general model under consideration. By restricting the policy space
to D (instead of D [ f;g) and setting 1(s) = 2(s) = 0 for all s, we obtain the standard Downsian
setting. The denitions below follow from specializing M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) in other ways.
Denition 2 Model M(D; 1(s); 2(s)): This model corresponds to the case in which the strategy
space of the candidates is restricted to D, so that ; is not feasible. Hence, we also refer to it as the
restricted model in which both candidates face noise in the interpretation of their announcements.
Although the strategy space of the model M(D; 1(s); 2(s)) is identical to the strategy space
of the standard Downsian model, the two models di¤er in that, while in M(D; 1(s); 2(s)) the
candidates face noise in the interpretation of their announcements, in the standard Downsian model
they do not.
Denition 3 Model M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)). In this model, there is no noise entering in the voters
interpretation of candidate 1s announcement.
Then, we use M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)) to refer to the specialization of M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) in
which 1(s) = 0 for every state of the world s: In other words, M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)) assumes that,
while candidate 2 faces an imperfect technology (so that announcement and interpretation may
di¤er), candidate 1 has access to a perfect technology of communication (so that announcement and
interpretation are identical). It is important to note that, even if the interpretation of candidate 2s
announcement is identical to the announcement itself, it is still the case that the vote shares of both
candidates are non-deterministic. This is because the vote share of each candidate depends on both
his announcement and his opponents announcement. Hence, as long as at least one candidate faces
noise in the interpretation of his announcement, there will be a random component in the expected
vote shares of both candidates.
Denition 4 Model M(D; 0; 2(s)): This model corresponds to the case in which the strategy space
of the candidates is restricted to D (so that ; is not feasible) and there is no noise entering in the
voters interpretation of candidate 1s announcement. Hence, we also refer to it as the restricted
model in which only candidate 2 faces noise in the interpretation of his announcements.
In other words, the modelM(D; 0; 2(s)) not only restricts the space of strategies of the candidates
but also assumes that only candidate 2 faces noise in the interpretation of his announcement.
For any of these models, the timing of the game is as follows. First, both candidates declare
a platform. Second, Nature draws a state of the world, which is used by the voters to form their
interpretation of the announcements. Third, the voters use this interpretation of the announcements
to cast their votes.
additive probabilities on :
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3 The Voters
We index candidates by c = 1; 2 and assume a continuum of voters, indexed by i, whose most
preferred policies ("ideal points") are distributed over the unit interval according to 	. We use
dc 2 D [ f;g to denote the declaration of platform made by candidate c in a one-dimensional polity.
Here, dc 2 D  [0; 1] denotes an announcement and dc = ; denotes a no-announcement. In case
dc = ; for some c, in any state of the world, the voters believe that, in case c wins the election,
the policy to be implemented will be drawn from a known distribution, common to both candidates,
which we leave unspecied. In case of announcement, all voters receive the same noisy signal of dc.
We use c; with c 2 f1; 2g; to denote the noise in the signal of candidate cs announcement; this
noise depends on the coordinate of the state of the world that corresponds to candidate c. Formally,
c : Sc ! f ; g; where  is a (small and) positive scalar. The simplest case we will consider
corresponds to c(l) =   and c(r) = . However, other cases will be also studied.
The interpretation of candidate cs announcement, denoted ic : [0; 1] ! [ c(l); 1 + c(r)]; c 2
f1; 2g has the following functional form
ic(dc; sc) = dc + c(sc) 8dc 6= ; (1)
At this time, the following technical point must be addressed. Combined, the assumptions
that (i) dc 2 [0; 1] and (ii) 	 is a distribution function over [0; 1], lead to the following issue with
boundaries. If a candidate declared an extreme platform, say 0, voters could never have a leftist
interpretation of this platform, since such an interpretation would imply that the voters believe the
candidate announced a platform to the left of 0 and, therefore, outside of the policy space. There
are several alternatives to formally deal with this problem. One of them is to assume that (i) dc 2 R
and (ii) 	 is a distribution function over R: However, this would force us to abandon the closed-form
results that are obtain when 	 is a distribution function over [0; 1]: Other alternative is to assume
that: (i) dc 2 R and (ii) 	 is a distribution function over [0; 1]. The latter alternative would imply
that the voters ideal points are distributed over a subset of the policy space. Because rational
candidates will never announce policy positions whose possible interpretations would lie outside
the support of the distribution of voters ideal points, it follows that, in equilibrium, the policies
announced by the candidates will necessary belong to a compact subset of R: Hence, as a practical
matter, there would be no substantive di¤erence with the case in which we assume that (i) dc 2 [0; 1]
and (ii) 	 is a distribution function over [0; 1]. We avoid this unnecessary complication sticking to
the assumptions that (i) dc 2 [0; 1] and (ii) 	 is a distribution function over [0; 1]:
Conditional on state s 2 S, the utility that voter i derives from the declaration of platform dc by
candidate c, c 2 f1; 2g; is given by ui : [0; 1]  Sc  [0; 1] ! R; we write ui(dc; sc; xi). The usual
spatial-preferences given by
ui(dc; sc; xi) =
(
  jdc + c(sc)  xij for dc 6= ;R   jn  xij dF (n) for dc = ; (2)
are assumed. Here, jj denotes absolute value, xi is voter is ideal point and F (n) represents the
votersbeliefs regarding the policy n 2 D   f;g to be implemented if the winner does not announce
policy. It is assumed that n is the realization of a random variable, N , from which the policy
implemented by a candidate that wins without announcing is drawn.12 Therefore, the distribution
12The symbols n and N stand for no-announcement.
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F (n) gives the probability that the realized policy for a winner with no-announcement is less than
or equal to n. We assume that F is common knowledge13 and represents the voters beliefs for both
candidates; we use  to denote its mean.
Consider M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)). This implies that, while i2 = d2 + (s2), i1 = d1: Then, the
probability that voter i votes for candidate 2 conditional on state s 2 S is given by
i;2(d2; d1js) =
8>>><>>>:
Pr [  jd2 + 2(s2)  xij >   jd1   xij] for d2 6= ;; d1 6= ;
Pr
R   jn  xij dF (n) >   jd1   xij for d2 = ;; d1 6= ;
Pr
R   jd2 + 2(s2)  xij > R   jn  xij dF (n) for d2 6= ;; d1 = ;
1
2 for d2 = ;; d1 = ;
(3)
Note that i;2(d2; d1js) only takes the values 0, 1 and 12 , representing support for candidate 1,
support for candidate 2 and tie, respectively. Note that, for d2 = ; there is no noise in the utility
u of the voters if there is no signal, there is no noise, but there is uncertainty, represented by F .
Finally, within expected utility, it must be that i;1(d1; d2js) = 1  i;2(d2; d1js):
Analogous procedures can be applied to derive i;c(d1; d2js) for the remainder models. We omit
this step to save space.
4 The Problem of the Candidates
The vote share of candidate c conditional to state s 2 S is
vc(dc; d cjs) =
Z
i;c(d2; d1js)d	:
Given that the preferences of the voters are perfectly spatial, when both candidates announce
policy, the vote share of candidate c conditional on state s is the area below the density function
of 	 in between one of the extremes of the distribution and the mean of the interpretations of the
announcements of the candidates.
Unless we explicitly indicate otherwise, throughout we consider M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)), so that the
space of states of the world has only two elements. Let us use Vc(dc; d c) to denote the expected vote
share of candidate c 2 f1; 2g, with  c 2 f1; 2g and  c 6= c, given the prole of strategies (dc; d c).
Within the expected utility framework it must be that
Vc(dc; d c) = vc;lql + vc;rqr;
where vc;l and vc;r are shortcuts for vc(dc; d cjl) and vc(dc; d cjr), respectively, and ql and qr denote
the probability of a leftist and rightist interpretation, respectively. Whenever the context avoids
confusion, we drop the subindex c in vc;l and vc;r: Throughout, we make the neutral assumption
that ql = qr = 12 ; which implies that the leftist and the rightist interpretations of candidate 2s
announcement are equally likely. The problem of candidate c 2 f1; 2g is to maximize Vc(; d c).
Note that to check whether a prole of strategies (dc ; d c) that constitutes an equilibrium in the
restricted model M(D; 0; 2(s)) also constitutes an equilibrium in the unrestricted model M(D [
f;g; 0; 2(s)), we just need to check that Vc(dc ; d c)  Vc(;; d c) for c; c 2 f1; 2g and  c 6= c.
13The assumption of common knowledge is fundamental. If it is violated (as in Glazer, 1990), results change
drastically. However, the violation of this assumption would cast doubt on the internal consistency of the game in
itself.
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Throughout, we useebc(d c) to denote candidate cs best response to candidates c strategy d c in
a restricted model (i.e, in eitherM(D; 0; 2(s)) orM(D; 1(s); 2(s)) ): Hence, ebc : D f;g ! D f;g.
Accordingly, we refer to ebc(d c) as candidate cs restricted best response to d c. In Appendix A, we
derive, for M(D; 0; 2(s)); ebc(). Two considerations need to be taken into account. First, because
M(D; 0; 2(s)) assumes an asymmetry in terms of the noise structure that the candidates face, the
restricted best response correspondences of the candidates need not be symmetric. Second, at least
to some extent, the restricted best response correspondences depend on the particular assumption
of 	 (in this case, a uniform distribution). In this latter respect, we make clear the point that any
symmetric and unimodal yields qualitatively similar results.
4.1 Equilibria within Expected Utility
In this subsection, we investigate under which conditions non-salience occurs in equilibrium. Propo-
sition 5, below, deals with M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)). Instead, propositions 8 and 7, below, deal with
M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)). The reason that propositions 5 deals with the case in which there is no
noise in the interpretation of one candidate is that the analysis of equilibrium is greatly simplied
under this assumption. The fact that Proposition 8 proves that there is a robust non-salient equi-
librium under the assumption that both candidates face identical structures makes clear that our
main result is not driven by any asymmetry in the candidatesproblem. The proofs are contained in
Appendix D, and rely heavily in the best response correspondences for M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)) derived
in Appendix A.
Throughout, 	 represents the distribution of ideal points of the voters, m represents the ideal
point of the median voter and  represents the mean of qthe votersbeliefs regarding the policy that
will be implemented by a winner that did not announce position. An alternative, more rigorous
statement of Proposition 5, below, can be obtained by introducing the concept of "-equilibrium.
The latter would circumvent the fact that, strictly speaking, in the standard Downsian setting the
best response of the candidates is empty for any position adopted by the opponent other than m.
However, more notation would need to be introduced without gaining any further insight.
Proposition 5 Consider M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)) and set 2(l) =  2(r): Assume   m (the case
 > m is analogous). A necessary condition for an equilibrium in which at least one candidate
strictly prefers not to announce position is 2	 () + 	

+d2+
2

 	

+d2 
2

> 1:
A direct corollary of Proposition 5 is that, in M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)), if 2(s) = 0 for all s, so
that there is no noise in the interpretation of any candidate, then, in equilibrium, the candidates
do announce position. (To see this note that, if 2(s) = 0 for all s, the condition in Proposition
5 reduces 	() > 12 , which can never be satised under the premise that   m.) This corollary
reinforces the idea that the noise in the interpretation of candidatesannouncements is necessary to
obtain non-salience. Also, Proposition 5 anticipates some of the results, in that it makes evident that
necessary condition for non-salience is that one candidate  and m be close enough. The following
case illustrates this point (its proof is contained in the Appendix).
Case 6 If 	 is the uniform distribution over the unit interval, then, for  < m;  > m   14 is a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium in which one candidate announces and the other
does not. The equilibrium is (d1; d2) = ( + ; ;); where  > 0 is an innitesimal scalar.
14
Because the optimal strategy of the candidate that faces the smallest noise (in this case: no noise)
is to make an epsilon deviation from the mean of the votersbeliefs about his opponent, it follows
from this example that in equilibrium there is "convergence" in the sense that the implicit or explicit
position of the candidates di¤ers only by an epsilon.
Proposition 7 below shows that in the model in which both candidates face noise in the interpre-
tation of their announcements, convergence to the ideal point of the median voter can be equilibrium.
The theorem presents su¢ cient conditions for (m;m) to be an equilibrium. Of course, the necessary
conditions may be less stringent. However, su¢ cient conditions are enough proof that our model is
also compatible with salient equilibria.14
Proposition 7 Consider M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) and set 1(l) =  2(r) and 1(r) =  2(l); with
c(s) 6= 0 for all c; s. A su¢ cient condition for the prole (m;m) to be a Nash equilibrium is that 	
be symmetric and that  < m+ 1(l) < m+ 1(r) or  > m+ 1(r) > m+ 1(l):
Note that Proposition 7 includes, but does not restrict to, the case 1(l) = 2(l) =  1(r) =
 2(r). Several other congurations of the parameters are compatible with its hypothesis. For
example, 1(l) =  0:1, 1(r) = 0:2, 2(l) =  0:2 and 2(r) = 0:1:
Now, consider M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) and assume that the magnitude of the noise terms is
identical across candidates and states of the world. Can it be that in equilibrium both candidates
prefer not to announce a policy position? This question is addressed in the next proposition, which
summarizes our main result.
Proposition 8 ConsiderM(D[f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) and assume that: 1(l) = 2(l) =  1(r) =  2(r).
In this setting, the prole (;; ;) is a (strict) Nash equilibrium if and only if 	( + ) > 1 	() >
	(   ) :
Proposition 8 says that there is an open set of values of the parameters in which both candidates
not annnouncing position is a strict equilibrium. The condition 	( + ) > 1   	() > 	(   )
has two possible readings. First, it may read that, for a xed   0 the parameters  and m have
to be close enough. Second, it may read that, for a xed  and m;  has to be large enough. The
following example illustrates this point.
Case 9 Assume 	 is the uniform distribution over the unit interval. It follows readily from Propo-
sition 5 that the prole (;; ;) is a (strict) Nash equilibrium if and only if m+ 12 >  > m+ 12:
Using a minimal set of assumptions, Propositions 5 and 8 overcome previous impossibility results
in the literature. Indeed, Berliant and Konishi (2005) have proved that, within expected utility,
in a robust equilibrium both candidates announce positions. The reason that we obtain di¤erent
results is that our models are formally di¤erent. In their setting, there is no noise in the voters
interpretation of the candidatesannouncement. Hence, in their model, the utility that candidate
c gets from not announcing policy, assuming risk neutral voters, is identical to the utility he gets
from announcing the mean of the votersbeliefs. In our model, the utility that, say, candidate 2
14 If both candidates were assumed to expect no noise in the interpretation of his opponent, (m;m) would be a
(strict) equilibrium, and would never obtain for the same conguration of parameters that a non-salient equilibrium
does. Note, however, that the latter assumption would imply a violation of the premise of common knowledge.
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gets from not announcing policy, assuming risk neutral voters, is identical to the utility he gets when
the voters interpretation coincides with the mean of their beliefs. The fact that there is a degree
of imprecision in his announcement precludes the candidate from having a perfect control over how
the voters will interpret his announcement. This degree of imprecision in candidate 2s technology
of communication increases the payo¤ of not announcing relative to the payo¤ of announcing the
best response in the restricted game, which leads the candidate to prefer not to announce for certain
values of the parameters.15
15Also, the fact that there is no noise in absence of announcement in turn breaks down the translation invariance
property of the preferences of the voters, key to the three proofs of the theorems in Berliant and Konishi (2005).
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5 Extensions Within Expected Utility
5.1 Two-candidate competition with maximization of expected probability of
winning
The insight behind Proposition 8 also applies when candidates are assumed to maximize expected
probability of winning (instead of expected vote share). To see this, let us now assume that there
are three (instead of two) possible interpretations of an announcement, and each of them occurs
with probability 13 . We refer to these interpretations as the leftist, the rightist and the correct
interpretation, and denote them by iC ; iR and iL, respectively. iC and iR are as before; iC is the
interpretation that coincides with the announcement of the candidate itself hence, iC may be seen
as the "correct" interpretation. We refer the reader to Figure 1.
Figure 1: Any unilateral deviation from (;; ;) leaves the candidate worse o¤. Candidate 2 deviates
to announce d2 = iC . The voters may interpret iL; iC or iR, which bring about cut points A, B and
C, respectively. While cut points A and B gives the victory to candidate 1; cut point C gives the
victory to candidate 2: Since each interpretation has probability 13 ; candidate 2s expected probability
of victory, 13 ; is lower than the probability of victory when no deviation occurs,
1
2 :
The gure makes evident that the prole (;; ;) is a Nash equilibrium. As Proposition 8 suggests,
the key to obtain non-salience is that  be close enough to m: When the latter condition is satised,
candidate 2 has basically two options. On one hand, he may announce the same implicit position than
candidate 1; that is, . In this case, if (i) i2 = iC ; candidate 2 wins with probability 12 ; (ii) i2 = iL,
candidate 2 loses with certainty, (iii) i2 = iR, candidate 2 loses with certainty (note that this presumes
that  and m are close enough or, alternatively, that  is large enough). Since each interpretation has
probability 13 ; this implies that candidate 2s vote share is
1
6 : On the other hand, he may announce
a position to the left of candidate 1s implicit position, such that the rightist interpretation of this
announcement is associated to a cut point like point C in the gure, which gives him the victory.
In this case, if (i) i2 = iC ; candidate 2 loses with certainty, (ii) i2 = iL, candidate 2 loses with
certainty, (iii) i2 = iR, candidate 2 wins with certainty. Since each interpretation has probability
1
3 ; this implies that candidate 2s vote share is
1
3 : This strategy dominates the previous one, but is
still strictly lower than the expected probability of winning at the prole (;; ;). Finally, note that to
obtain non-salience it is required that, in addition to the leftist and rightist interpretation, there be
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also a third possible interpretation of the announcements, iC . Otherwise, candidate 2 can generically
obtain a vote share of 12 using a strategy similar to the second one described in this paragraph.
5.2 Multi-candidate competition
The rationale behind Proposition 8 also applies in electoral competitions with more than two can-
didates. However, the more candidates participate in the competition, the more stringent are the
conditions under which all candidates will prefer not to announce position. In fact, under conditions
equivalent to those of Proposition 8, in a competition with N candidates, all candidates not an-
nouncing position is an equilibrium if and only if 	( + ) > 2(N 1)N  	() > 	(   ) (the proof
is analogous to that of Proposition 8).
Example 10 Assume that 	 is the uniform distribution on [0; 1]. Set N = 3 and  = 410 : The
necessary and su¢ cient condition to obtain an equilibrium in which the three candidates opt for
no-announcement reduces to 815 >  >
7
15 :
The reason that, as N increases, the conditions under which non-salience occurs in equilibrium
are more and more stringent is as follows. Since the votersbeliefs are assumed to be identical across
candidates, the expected vote share for a candidate at the prole in which all candidates do not
announce position is 1N . If a candidate deviates from the latter prole, the votes split as follows. A
share 0    1 of the vote goes to the candidate that deviates, and the rest, 1   , is divided in
identical shares between the remainder N  1 candidates, so that each receives, in expectation, N 1 .
When a new candidate enters the competition, the vote share that goes to the unique candidate that
deviates from ; remains intact (namely, is equal to ), and the remaining (N +1)  1 candidates get
now a smaller share, given by N . Therefore, the payo¤ of deviating relative to declaring ; decreases
monotonically as N increases.
The proposition that, asN increases, the conditions under which non-salience occurs become more
stringent constitutes an empirical implication of our theoretical model. Moreover, if, in addition, we
consider Duvergers law, our theory predicts that polities under plurality rule should be more prone
to generate non-salience than polities under proportional representation.
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6 Ambiguity Aversion
6.1 CandidatesProblem
The candidates, indexed by c = 1; 2; seek to maximize expected vote share in a one-dimensional
political contest with simultaneous moves. Letting 	 represent distribution of votersideal points,
the vote share of candidate c conditional on state s 2 S is
vc(d1; d2js) =
Z
i;c(d1; d2js)d	; (4)
where the function i;c is as dened in Equation (3). Note that, because it is conditioned on a
particular state of the world, there is no stochastic element entering in Equation (4)
For simplicity, throughout this section we assume that 	 is the uniform distribution over the unit
interval. It is straightforward to obtain the same qualitative results with any other symmetric and
unimodal distribution. Moreover, we conjecture that unimodality alone may su¢ ce to obtain similar
qualitative results.
An act is a mapping from the cross product of strategy proles and states, D[f;gD[f;gS,
to the range of the function vc; namely [0; 1].16 We write vc(dc; d c) to denote the act that candidate
c faces when the strategy prole is (dc; d c). A conditional act for candidate c is a mapping from
the cross product of cs strategy set and state set, D [ f;g  S, to the range of the function vc;
namely [0; 1]; we write vc(; d c): When candidate c chooses strategy dc, he is basically choosing the
conditional act vc(dc; d c) from which the electoral result will be drawn, after Nature draws the state
of the world. The next step consists of endowing the candidates with preferences that allow them to
rank conditional acts.
In the standard expected utility framework discussed in the previous section, it was implicitly
assumed that the candidates choose among acts by computing the expected value, Es2S [vc(d1; d2)];
using a unique and common prior belief: Now, we depart from this framework by assuming that
the candidates have multiple ("ambiguous") beliefs; we use () to denote this set of beliefs. The
candidates do not know which, among the many beliefs () is the actual probability distribution
of states of the world.
In order to deal with the many beliefs, the candidates need to be endowed with a certain rule.
Since in this extension of the model we aim to account for the fears that candidates may have
regarding the possibility that either his opponent or, in general, the mass media, engage in "negative
campaigning" against the candidate, maximin expected utility with multiple priors strikes as an
appropriate rule. Namely, in a context in which interpretations and announcements may di¤er such
is the distinguishing premise of our baseline model, it seems sensible to assume that each candidate
c 2 f1; 2g is concerned with the possibility that his opponent,  c; attempts to convince the voters
that the "correct" interpretation of cs announcement is whichever is most convenient for  c; and,
therefore, less convenient for  c. The quotation in which Michael Dukakis explains the role played
by "phraseology" and negative campaigning in the 1988 election (above in the Introduction) provides
anecdotal evidence that this behavior may be present among political candidates.
16An intuitive (although inexact) notion of an act is its identication with the concept of lottery. The di¤erence is
that a lottery is an specication of consequences and their probabilities, while an act is an specication of consequences
and the states of the world in which they obtain (but not their probabilities).
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To model this behavior on the part of the candidates, we use the variational representation of
preferences (Maccheroni et al., 2006a), which generalizes maximin expected utility with multiple
priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). It has been proved that the behavioral assumptions made by
these two approaches are almost identical, since the axioms on which they rely are (Maccheroni et
al., 2006a). Aside from their high degree of generality, some specializations of variational preferences
are very tractable and, in particular, di¤erentiable. The main advantage over maximin preferences
is that calculus can be used.
A preference is called variational if it satises the following axioms: weak order, weak certainty
independence, continuity, monotonicity, uncertainty aversion and nondegeneracy (see Maccheroni et
al., 2006a). The axiom of uncertainty aversion is usually interpreted as an ambiguity aversion axiom
(among others, see Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989, and Epstein 1999). For an extended discussion of
ambiguity aversion, we refer the reader to Ellsberg (1961).
Individuals endowed with ambiguity averse preferences in general (and variational preferences in
particular) are customarily interpreted as believing that they are playing a zero-sum game against a
malevolent agent. Such "paranoid" behavior has been encountered in experiments where the individ-
uals have limited information (see, for example, Keren and Gerritsen, 1999). Variational preferences
allow for di¤erent degrees of "paranoia". If extreme paranoia is assumed, then the individuals behave
as a maximinimizers of expected utility with multiple priors. In such a case, the interpretation is
straightforward: the individuals believe that they will confront the worst possible scenario. How-
ever, variational preferences also allow for moderate degrees of paranoia. Finally, among variational
preferences, we choose Gini preferences to represent the preferences of the candidates, because they
are very tractable and di¤erentiable. The utility functional is introduced below, as Functional (5).
6.2 The Game
Consider model M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)): The timing of the game is as follows. In period t = 0, the
candidates declare platforms simultaneously. A declaration of a platform by candidate c 2 f1; 2g
is either (i) an announcement of policy dc 2 D; or (ii) a no-announcement, namely dc = ;: Gini
preferences imply that candidate c ranks act vc(d1; d2) according to the following utility functional,
V (vc(dc; d c)) = min
pc2(q)
Z
vc(dc; d c)dpc +  (pcjjq)

(5)
where  > 0 is the ambiguity coe¢ cient, which we assume to be the same for both candidates. The
closer  comes to zero, the more ambiguity averse the candidate is.  (pjjq) is the relative Gini
index between distributions p and q:17 An individual endowed with ambiguity averse preferences has
multiple beliefs, (q), and acts as if there were a malevolent inuence playing a zero-sum game
against him. Functional (5) makes evident that the hostile inuence is allegedly exerted through the
choice of a prior adverse to candidate c, denoted pc 2 (q):
At the beginning of period t = 1, Nature draws the noise in the interpretation of candidate 1s
announcement (in case there was announcement), and also the noise in the interpretation of candidate
2s announcement (in case there was announcement). Some of the propositions below consider
M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)); in which candidate 1 faces no noise in the interpretation of his announcement,
instead of M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)). This reduces the space of states of the world entering into both
17 (pjjq) is formally introduced below, as Equation (6).
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V (v1(d1; d2)) and V (v2(d2; d1)) to S = S2 = fl(eft); r(ight)g, simplifying the analysis. Because
the candidates have multiple priors, they do not expect Nature to draw the noise terms from the
reference distribution q; each of them expects Nature to use a distribution from (q) that gives him
a lower expected utility than q. It is important to note that, because each candidate believes that
there is a malevolent inuence acting against him, two prior beliefs regarding the state of world are
relevant: (i) the prior that candidate 1 thinks the hostile inuence chooses to weaken him, (ii) the
prior that candidate 2 thinks the hostile inuence chooses to weaken him. This is irrespective of
whether both candidates or only one candidate face noise in his interpretation. (In other words, it is
true for both M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)) and M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) ) The only di¤erence assuming noise
in one or both interpretations makes is how many elements are in the set of states of the world, S.
At the end of period t = 1, the voters use the noises drawn by Nature, s 2 S, to form their
interpretation of the announcements of each candidate, ic. For simplicity, we assume that the in-
terpretation of announcements is identical across voters. If a candidate did not announce, then the
voters assume that in case he wins a policy drawn from the distribution F (n) will be implemented.
We call F (n) the beliefs of the voters. We simplify by assuming that these beliefs are identical across
voters and are the same for both candidates. Finally, voters use these interpretations to cast their
votes. Voters are assumed to have standard spatial preferences exhibiting risk neutrality. The game
is depicted in Figure 2 (at the end of this paper). To avoid confusion, note that we are deviating
from the game theoretic convention of Nature moving rst that is, before any player. This is only
for the sake of exposition. We could assume that Nature moves rst and the candidates cannot see
Natures move. We did not do this just to be consistent with our interpretation that candidates act
as if there were a malevolent agent that picks the distribution from which Nature will draw.
6.3 Gini Preferences
The problem of the candidates is to maximize Functional (5). Hence, from a formal point of view,
the model can be closed by establishing (i) a functional form for  (pcjjq) and, (ii) an equilibrium
concept. However, it may be useful to rst discuss the interpretation of Functional (5).
We focus on one particular aspect of Functional (5), namely
arg min
pc2(q)
Z
vc(dc; d c)dpc +  (pcjjq)

:
In our interpretation of the model, this problem can be stated as: What distribution of noise
candidate c believes Nature will draw the noises from? We refer to this as the hostile inuences
problem.18
Under the Gini preferences assumption, each candidate believes that the hostile inuence will
choose a prior, pc, from the set (q); that weakens his expected vote share. However, this paranoia
needs not be absolute. Indeed, unlike the maximin multiple priors framework, variational preferences
do not imply that the candidates expect the malevolent agent to choose the prior that minimizes
their expected utility. This is because the choice of distribution is constrained by a structure, as we
explain next.
18 It should be clear by now that because the hostile inuence is only a mental construction of the players, the hostile
inuences problem is, more precisely, the problem that each candidate believes the alleged hostile inuence faces.
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On one hand, the hostile inuence bears a certain cost of implementing her choice of a prior
distribution. This cost is given by the term  (pcjjq) in Functional (5) above. The larger the
"distance" between the choice of distribution and an (exogenously given) reference distribution, the
costlier it becomes for the hostile inuence the implementation of that choice.19 Hence, the hostile
inuence must pay a cost in order to force Nature to sample from an alternative distribution. (And
the candidates understand that the larger the deviation is, the costlier its implementation becomes.)
On the other hand, the hostile inuence gets utility from weakening the candidates position; or,
equivalently put, it gets disutility from every unitary increase in the candidates expected vote share.
This disutility is given by the term
R
vc(dc; d c)dpc in Functional (5) above.
Note that each candidate thinks of the media as a rational actor in the sense that, given the
cost of implementing a choice of prior and the disutility of the candidates expected vote share, it
implements the optimal prior distribution. Namely, each candidate acts as if the hostile inuence
were endowed with a utility function and seeks to maximize it. This utility function would be equal
to the opposite of the sum of the candidates expected utility and the cost of inducing such expected
utility conditional on the chosen prole of strategies (by implementing a particular distribution of
noise). In order to aggregate these two heterogenous bads, a ratio that represents the marginal rate
of substitution between them (for the hostile inuence) is required. We refer to this ratio as the
coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion. For simplicity, we assume that both candidates believe that the
hostile inuence has the same coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion. The coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion
is given by the constant  in Expression (5). Note, nally, that from our perspective, the reference
distribution is the real distribution of noise.
It may be helpful to discuss how Functional (5) works when the coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion,
, tends to its extreme values: 0 and 1. Consider rst a coe¢ cient close to 0. This means that
the hostile inuence is willing to provide any amount of e¤ort in exchange for the reduction of one
vote in the candidates expected vote share. (Equivalently, the disutility of spending an extra unit
of e¤ort in reducing the candidatesexpected vote share is zero). Not surprisingly, a coe¢ cient close
to 0 is equivalent to assuming that the candidates behave as maximinimizers of expected utility with
multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). Consider now a coe¢ cient approaching to 1: This
means that the hostile inuence is willing to give up any amount of candidatesvote share in exchange
for a reduction of its e¤ort in one unit. (Equivalently, the marginal utility of a malevolent act is
zero). Not surprisingly, a coe¢ cient approaching 1 is equivalent to assuming that the candidates
behave as standard maximizers of expected utility. For further details on variational preferences,
and for the proof of the insights o¤ered in this paragraph, we refer the reader to Maccheroni et al.
(2006).
We use pc = (pc;l; pc;r) to denote any distribution that candidate c 2 f1; 2g may expect to be
implemented against him. And we use pc =

pc;l; p

c;r

to denote the distribution that maximizes the
hostile inuences utility function. The cost to induce pc = (pc;l; pc;r) is given by the Gini relative
index 20 between pc and the reference distribution q. The Gini relative index between pc and q is
given by
19To measure the distance between distributions, we use relative entropy.
20The Gini relative index is a divergence.
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 (pcjjq) 
p2c;l
ql
+
p2c;r
qr
  1: (6)
The reference distribution q gives the distribution of noise in the absence of any malevolent
inuence for any ordered pair of announcements by candidates 1 and 2, namely (d1; d2). We assume
ql = qr =
1
2
(7)
where ql represents the probability of event sl, and qr the probability of event sr. To rule out any
asymmetry, the reference distribution is the same for both candidates.
6.4 Equilibrium Concept
A strategy for candidate c is a choice of action dc 2 D [ f;g: An equilibrium for this game is a
strategy prole (d1; d2) 2 D [ f;g D [ f;g satisfying certain conditions. Note that for any given
strategy prole, candidate 1 and candidate 2s beliefs about the "optimal" choice of distribution by
the media, p1 and p2; respectively, are endogenously given by Functional (5).
Denition 11 A Nash equilibrium for this game is a prole of strategies (d1; d2) 2 D[f;gD[f;g
such that, for c 2 f1; 2g, V (vc(dc ; d c))  V (vc(dc; d c)) for all dc 2 D [ f;g:
We refer to
pc = arg min
pc2(q)
Z
vc(d

c ; d

 c)dpc +  (pcjjq)

(8)
as candidate cs belief, for c 2 f1; 2g.
6.5 Restricted Best Response Correspondences Summarized
Throughout, m represents the most-preferred policy of the median voter and  represents the mean
of the votersbeliefs regarding the policy that will be implemented by a winner that did not announce
position.
In Appendix B, we characterize the restricted best response correspondences of candidate 1 and
candidate 2. There are three possible restricted best responses for candidate 2 namely for, say,
  m; d2 +  + ; d2 +  and 1   d1and two possible restricted best responses for candidate 1
namely for, say,   m; d1 +  + ; d1 +  and 1  d2.
Recall that throughout this (ambiguity aversion) section, we simplify the analysis by assuming
that 	 is the uniform distribution over the unit interval. Consider the best response of candidate
1 to d2 2 [0; 1]. For, say,   m; it must be that eb1(d2) = argmaxd12fd2++;d2+;1 d2g V (v1(d1; d2)):
Of course, which one of the three alternatives is the actual best response depends on the value
that d2 takes. In Appendix B we show that V1 (1  d2; d2) = 12 + 12; and that V1 (d2 +  + ; d2) =
1  d2   12   1162: Hence, it follows that V1 (1  d2; d2)  V1 (d2 +  + ; ; d2) if and only if
1
2
+
1
2
 > 1  d2   1
2
   1
16
2;
which after algebraic manipulation reduces to
d2 > m     1
16
2:
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Also, V1 (d2 + ; d2) = 34   12d2 + 116d2   116d22   164 : Hence, it follows that V1 (1  d2; d2) 
V1 (d2 + ; d2) if and only if
1
2
+
1
2
 >
3
4
  1
2
d2 +
1
16
d2   1
16
d22  
1
64
;
which after algebraic manipulation reduces to
d2  m  :
Proceeding in an analogous fashion, it is possible to obtain the following specication.
V1 (1  d2; d2) >
(
V1 (d2 +  + ; d2)
V1 (d2 + ; d2)
if
0 < m  d2 <  + 1162
0 < m  d2 < 
V1 (1  d2; d2) >
(
V1 (d2      ; d2)
V1 (d2   ; d2) if
0 < d2  m <  + 1162
0 < d2  m < 
V2 (1  d1; d1) > V2 (d1 +  + ; d1) if 0 < m  d1 < 1162
V2 (1  d1; d1) > V2 (d1      ; d1) if 0 < d1  m < 1162
Note that ebc(d c) = 1 d c for "central" values of d c, that is, for d c close enough to m: In par-
ticular, it can be readily seen that (dc; d c) = (m;m) will always be an equilibrium inM(D; 0; 2(s)),
since for any values of  and , ebc(m) = 1 m = m. Also, as  becomes larger, and  becomes lower,
more equilibria will emerge in this restricted model. To see why, x any d c; and note that as
 decreases and  increases, ebc(d c) = 1   d c will eventually become the restricted best response
to d c. Because the median is m = 12 ; it follows that the prole of strategies (1   d c; 1   dc) is
symmetric around m: For example, consider  # 0. In this case, the set of equilibria surrounding
m will increase in size until becoming f(m    2 ;m +  2)g2[0;1]: It must be that, in equilibrium,
 2 [0; 1]; because otherwise the distance between the announcements of the candidates will be larger
than :
It is straightforward to extend all these results to any unimodal and symmetric distribution 	.
Qualitatively, the results would be identical. Quantitatively, however, there would be some di¤erence,
since V (vc(d c +  + ; d c)) would yield a di¤erent value. We conjecture that similar qualitative
results may be obtain for 	 asymmetric but unimodal.
6.6 The equilibria in the extended game
The best response correspondences summarized in the previous section allows us to obtain the equi-
libria in the restricted game M(D; 0; 2(s)): Now, we build on these results to shed some light on the
equilibria of M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)) and M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)): The rationale for our procedure is as
follows.
The strategy dc = ; is a best response to d c 2 D inM(D[f;g; 0; 2(s)) if and only if Vc(;; d c) >
Vc(ebc(d c); d c): Also, since voters are risk neutral, d2 = ; is a best response to d1 = ; in M(D [
f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) if and only if V2(;; ;)  V2(eb2(); ) in M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)). (Recall that  is the
mean of the voters beliefs regarding the policy that a candidate that did not announce policy will
implement in case he wins.)
Proposition 12 states the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for non-salience to be an equilibrium
in M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)).
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Proposition 12 Consider M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) and assume that 	 is the uniform distribu-
tion over the unit interval. Assume that both candidates face identical parameters: 1(l) = 2(l) =
 1(r) =  2(r). For any   4 , the prole (;; ;) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
m+
1
2
 +
1
16
2

>  > m  1
2
   1
16
2:
It follows readily from Propositions 12 and Case 9 that ambiguity aversion amplies the likelihood
of candidates opting for no-announcement. That is, as the candidates become more and more
ambiguity averse, the values of the parameters for which non-salience occurs in equilibrium is larger
and larger. It also follows that non-salience is only possible for non-zero values of : Otherwise, we
go back to standard Downsian problem and the impossibility results of Berliant and Konishi (2005)
obtain. The larger , the more likely the candidates will opt for no-announcement in equilibrium.
Also, if  = m; it is always the case that the candidates prefer not to announce.
The need of the threshold   4 stems from the fact that the probabilities p depend on  (see
Appendix C). After this threshold, the probabilities become degenerate and lower levels of  no
longer bring about a change in V (vc(dc; d c)): This implies that the values of  for which there is
non-salience can only be enlarged, using ambiguity aversion, up to some point.21
In order to investigate the salient equilibria, it is analytically helpful to restrict our attention to
M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)):
Proposition 13 Consider M(D[f;g; 0; 2(s)) and assume that 	 is the uniform distribution over
the unit interval. For any   4 ; the prole (m;m) is an equilibrium if and only if either   m  
or   m+ :
Proposition 13 says that   jm  j is a su¢ cient condition for convergence to the median to be
an equilibrium of the game M(D[f;g; 0; 2(s)): Note that this condition is independent of . Then,
even for  close to zero (high levels of ambiguity aversion) it is possible to obtain robust salience,
as long as  is su¢ ciently distant from m: As  becomes closer to m (or, alternatively,  increases),
convergence to the median is no longer an equilibrium.
Altogether, propositions 12 and 13 suggest that our model is able to generate both salient and
non-salient equilibria within the ambiguity aversion framework. Similar considerations follow from
the propositions in the previous section, within the expected utility framework. In this respect, the
model is prima facie congruent with actual politics, where both salient and non-salient outcomes are
observed. However, a nice feature of our model is that it allows a much more challenging empirical
test. In the next section, we describe and pursue this empirical test using data on actual U.S. Senate
elections.
21The largest the set of values of  for which non-salience occurs is [m  3
4
;m+ 3
4
]; which corresponds to  = 
4
:
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7 Testable Implications
No matter whether the candidates are expected utility maximizers or ambiguity averse, a robust
implication of our theoretical model is that the larger the magnitude of noise entering in the voters
interpretation of the announcements, the more likely the candidates will prefer not to announce policy
(see Propositions 5, 8 and 12 above). The aim of this section is to test this empirical implication.
In our theoretical model, the candidates have only one possible means of delivering their mes-
sages to the population. In the real world, the literature distinguishes two types (or, in our terms,
"technologies") of communication within TV campaigns: paid ads (PA) and news coverage (NC).
Ansolabehere et al. (1993) report that senatorial campaigns rely primarily on PA and only secondarily
on NC.
Two di¤erences between NC and PA are relevant to our analysis. First, while NC can alter, bias
or misrepresent the events of a campaign (and, in particular, a candidates speech), PA circumvents
any intervention by the media in the delivery of a message to the voters, and therefore prevents
any source of distortion. Moreover, since advertising is protected by the constitutional right of free
speech, the candidates can deliver any message they want to the voters, no matter how untruthful
it may be.22 In brief, the messages that, through NC technology, would be subjected to censorship,
distortion or critique by journalists or anchormen, can be delivered straightforward to the voters
using PA technology. In terms of the parameters of our theoretical model, it seems reasonable to
say that the delivery of a message through NC is associated with a large magnitude of noise in the
voters interpretation of the announcements of the candidates, and that the delivery of a message
through PA is associated with a small magnitude of noise. The second di¤erence is that, while NC
has no cost at all for the candidates, PA is a rather expensive technology for delivering messages to
the voters. (This specic issue will be further discussed in the next subsection.)
Our empirical analysis relies on the following premises:
(i) when considering strategic choices, candidates are concerned about the possibility that voters
misinterpret their announcements,
(ii) any eventual misinterpretation by the voters can be (at least partially) corrected by airing
PA that clarify the issue,
(iii) candidates may engage in costly fund-raising activity in order to collect money to buy PA,
(iv) the cost structure of fund-raising is similar across states.
Premises (i)-(iv) let us informally extend the theoretical model in the main body of this paper
to a more realistic setting. In this setting, the candidates can not only announce or not announce
but also have the option of making further announcements in order to correct eventual voters
misinterpretations.
Premise (i) is the mainstay of the theoretical model in the main body of this paper. Premise (ii)
suggests that PA is the technology that gives the candidates a level of precision enough to either
minimize the likelihood of misinterpretations in their announcements or emend observed misinter-
pretations.23 It follows from this assumption that the price of PA represents the cost of conveying
22The prevalence of "ad-watches" may partially restrain the candidatesfrom delivering untruthful messages. How-
ever, Ansolabehere and Reeves (1997, page) point out that, because they increase the exposure of the candidates,
ad-watches usually cause an e¤ect opposite to the desired.
23Because one could argue that PAs may correspond to negative, rather than positive, ads, some discussion may be
needed. First, and perhaps most important, to substantiate our arguments, all we need to assume is that the candidates
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a message whose interpretation will be (at least partially) free of noise. Premise (iii) provides the
candidates a means to raise the money necessary to purchase this technology.24 Premise (iv) has been
already used in the literature (see Gerber, 1998). The two most compelling justications are that
Senators usually raise individual donations from out of state (Sorauf, 1992) and a substantive share
of the contributions come from Political Action Committees (PACs), which contribute in exchange
for the senatorscommitment to vote in a certain way on particular issues.
The following simple example may help to understand the rationale behind our test of the empir-
ical implication of the model. Consider two states, which only di¤er in their population size. State L
has a large population and State S has a small population. It is important to keep in mind that we
are not considering competing candidates. Instead, we considering two candidates running di¤erent
races; one of them runs for a Senate seat to represent State L and the other runs for a Senate seat
to represent State S. The candidates are compulsorily subject to news coverage (NC), but have the
option to deliver messages using paid ads (PA). NC is free, but, unlike messages delivered through
PA, it may lead to the misinterpretation of the announcements made by the candidates. Premise (i)
says that the candidates are concerned about the chance that voters misinterpret their announce-
ments. Therefore, in evaluating whether or not to announce position, the candidates will consider
the consequences, in term of their expected payo¤, of an eventual misinterpretation. By assumption
(ii), the candidates know that, in case of misinterpretation, they will have to give away an amount
of money proportional to the cost of airing PA that emend the misinterpretation. By premise (iii),
this monetary cost can, in turn, be reduced to time, e¤ort and promises made in exchange of con-
tributions (these three are the main inputs of the fund-raising campaigns). At this point, we let the
reader know that a well-established fact of TV media markets is that the cost of airing a TV ad is
mainly determined by the size of the TV market (this is thoroughly discussed in the next subsection).
This implies that the candidate running for State L will face a larger cost of airing TV ads than the
candidate running for State S. By premise (iv), the cost that the candidates running for states L and
S must incur to nance PA is similar.
In this context, the empirical implication of our theoretical model can be formulated as a simple
comparative-static exercise. On one hand, the candidate running for State L faces a higher cost of
PA than the candidate running for State S. On the other hand, the candidate running for State L has
the same endowment of time and political freedom than the candidate running for State S. Clearly,
time and political freedom are the main inputs of any fund-raising campaign. The assumption that
candidates face similar fund-raising structures implies that both candidates can transform time and
political freedom into dollars at similar rates (i.e., with similar levels of e¤ectiveness). Since the cost
of emending a misinterpretation by the voters (in terms of time and political freedom) is higher for
the candidate running for State L than for the candidate running for State S, it readily follows that
opportunity cost of announcing position is higher for the candidate running for State L than for the
have the means to make precise announcements if they feel the need to do so. That is, the concern of the candidates
or campaign directors need not be to make precise announcements ex ante. More likely, what they may be concerned
about is the lack of possibilities to emend a wrong interpretation of their positions once this interpretation has been
made. Then, even an observed share of 100% of negative ads would not be, at least theoretically, a concern for our
line of reasoning. Second, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1996, p. 49) have shown, using lab experiments, that in both
Presidential and Senate campaigns, "voters come away from positive and negative advertisements with about the same
level of issue information".
24One could think of a formal model where the candidates are endowed with some scarce resource (like time or
political freedom) which can be used to raise funds in order to buy PA and improve the electoral performance.
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candidate running for State S. We can now state the empirical implication that corresponds to this
version of our theoretical model as follows. Ceteris paribus, the higher the price of PA in a political
district, the lower the probability that the candidate will announce position.
The example above illustrates some important points. First, di¤erences in the population size
across states su¢ ce to generate variation in the opportunity cost of announcing position. This
suggests that there are aspects of the phenomenon of non-salience deeply rooted in the fundamentals
of a polity, rather than on social norms or institutions.
Second, the example shows that the money available to the candidates can be easily endogeneized
in the model. As a result, the amount of money available to the candidates is ultimately determined
by the fund-raising e¤orts of the candidates. Namely, fund-raising is costly in terms of time, money
and political degrees of freedom.
Third, and most importantly, the key independent variable to test the model is the cost of PA
across states, and not the number of PA aired by the candidates. Namely, what is relevant to
the decision problem of the candidates is the expected cost of emending the voters beliefs, and
not the ex-post cost. The theoretical model developed in the main body of this paper is static in
nature, assumes that the candidates know with certainty that the voters will misinterpret their
announcements (although they do not know the direction of this misinterpretation) and, above all,
assumes that candidates have no means to emend possible misinterpretations by the voters. The
reason why these simplications have been made in our theory part is that they simplify greatly the
analysis. However, in a more realistic setting, when the candidates make their strategic decisions
on whether to announce or not to announce position, they take into account the fact that if an
announcement is made, the voters interpretation will be observed and possible misinterpretations
can be emended (at a certain cost) by airing more and more accurate messages, which will update
the votersinterpretation. 25 Clearly, in this setting the key variable in the candidatescost-benet
analysis that will decide their strategy is the expected cost of emending eventual misinterpretations
by the voters. Unlike this latter expected cost, the actual number of PA or the money spent in PA
could not be valid measures for the opportunity cost of announcing position. This is because our
analysis requires a measure of the opportunity cost of announcing position at the moment of making
the strategic decision, not after this decision has been made.26
The remainder of this section is devoted to empirically test the mentioned theoretical implication.
We carry out a cross-sectional analysis of the Senate elections in the USA. As we will show, this
analysis benets from the fact that prices of PA vary a lot across states much more than across
time. The choice of Senate, instead of House races, is due to the fact that House campaigns do not
rely on TV ads as much as Senate candidates (to the point that some candidates do not advertise
on TV at all).
25Although presumably complex, this richer version of the theoretical game may be technically feasible even with
ambiguity averse candidates. Technical frameworks appropriate for this kind of models are Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1993) and Maccheroni et al. (2006b).
26Assuming that a candidate did announce position, the actual number of PA or the money spent in PA is a
measure of the ex-post cost, i.e., it is a measure of the cost of having emended the distortions in the interpretation
of his announcement. However, since the idea of our analysis is to model the decision itself of announcing (i.e., the
probability of announcing), we can not use a measure that is valid only if the candidates are assumed to have announced.
In other words, using the actual number of PA or the money spent in PA would be a highly distorted measure of this
cost, since those candidates that did announce position will have aired more PA (and have spent more money) than
those candidates that did not announce position.
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7.1 Measures and Data description
We use the Passed NPAT / Failed NPAT status of the National Political Awareness Test (NPAT)
as a measure of whether the candidates announced or did not announced policy. NPAT is a key
component of Project Vote Smart (PVS), a well-known, serious non-prot organization that aims to
provide citizens with abundant and accurate information about the U.S. political candidates at any
level. The aim of the NPAT, as described by Project Vote Smart, is to measure each candidates
willingness to provide citizens with their issue positions. Each election, PVS organizes an e¤ort of
over 200 media organizations and political leaders who write, call, and repetitiously encourage each
and every candidate to provide essential information regarding his/her position on di¤erent relevant
issues. Candidates who agree to ll out a form of questions regarding their positions on many issues,
sign it and submit it back, knowing that this information will be uploaded and distributed freely,
are given the status "Passed NPAT". Candidates that do not accept, or, simply, do not respond
to the queries of PVS and the 200 media organizations and political leaders, are given the status
"Failed NPAT".27 Citizens can access the failed/passed status, as well as the complete form lled
out by the candidates specifying their positions in every issue, free of any charge, either online or
by phone, at any time. Project Vote Smart reports to have reached, for the last election, 16 million
database hits a day (Project Vote Smart, 2006). Although PVS has been collecting NPAT tests
since its foundation in 1988, only data on current o¢ ce holders is publicly available. Project Vote
Smart generously agreed to provide us the NPAT of the candidates that lost the 2006 Senate election.
Therefore, our data set comprises the NPAT of all the Senators in o¢ ce at the current time (June
2007), who may have been elected in 2002, 2004 or 2006, plus the NPAT of all the candidates that
lost the 2006 Senate election (n = 131). The NPAT is a dummy variable, where 0 denotes that the
candidate failed the NPAT and 1 denotes that the candidate passed the NPAT. Passed NPAT means
that the candidate lled out, signed and submitted Project Vote Smarts form asking the candidate
to report his position on several issues, and Failed NPAT means that the candidate failed to take
this series of actions.
We use cost per point of spot TV advertisement, which comes from the Media Market Guide
(2004), as a basis for the construction of our measure of the cost of paid ads (PA). The cost per
point (CPP) is an estimate of the dollars required to deliver one rating point (or one percent of the
audience) of any designated population within a spot TV market (DMA) area. Importantly, TV
market areas, called designated market areas (DMAs) need not coincide with political districts. On
one hand, a particular DMA may extend across counties of more than one state. For example, the
so-called New York DMA comprises, among many others, the counties of Faireld (CT), Essex (NJ),
Kings (NY), and Pike (PA). On the other hand, di¤erent counties within a particular state may be
spanned by di¤erent DMAs. For example, California comprises, among many others, the DMAs of
Los Angeles, Sacramento-Stockton-Modesto, San Diego and San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose. As we
will explain shortly, the lack of a one-to-one correspondence between political districts and DMAs
has important implications that need to be accounted for in our analysis.
27Textually from Project Vote Smart, "[t]he National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) asks candidates which items
they will support if elected. It does not ask them to indicate which items they will oppose. Through extensive research
of public polling data, we have discovered that voters are more concerned with what candidates would support when
elected to o¢ ce, not what they oppose. If a candidate does not select a response to any part or all of any question, it
does not necessarily indicate that the candidate is opposed to that particular item. "
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TV cost across DMAs varies greatly. While the CCP in 2004 reaches $ 1,477 in the most expensive
DMA, New York (NY), it is just $ 5 in the most inexpensive DMA, North Platte (NE); the median
CPP among all markets is $ 150, which corresponds to Milwaukee (WI).28 Being the basic unit
used to construct media plans and budgeting schedules across markets, CPP is available for di¤erent
demographic groups, quarterly and for di¤erent day parts. For the sake of our research, any of these
variants of CPP could be used, since the relative CPP across media markets remains more or less the
same for any possible combination of demographic group, quarter, year and day time. In our data,
the demographic group is households, the quarter is the second quarter of 2004 and the day time is
late news.29 Because CPP is the cost per one percent of the audience, the di¤erence in CPP between,
say, New York (NY) and North Platte (NE) is primarily driven by the fact that one percent of New
Yorks audience comprises a much larger number of households that one percent of North Plattes
audience. We use this measure, rather than, say, cost per thousand households, because the impact
of an ad seen by one thousand households in a large market like is obviously very di¤erent than the
impact of an ad seen by one thousand households in a small market. The use of a measure that
accounts for a given percentage, rather than a given number, of households, makes the cross-market
measures comparable.
A more debatable methodological aspect of our study is the construction of the cost of political
advertising. The question is: what is the cost of political advertising in each state? If there were a
one-to-one correspondence between TV markets and political districts, the solution would be simple.
But there is none. The rst problem is that to advertise in say, Newark (NJ), a political candidate is
forced to pay the whole price of advertising in the New York DMA. Note that from the candidates
point of view, this is a rather ine¢ cient investment, since to deliver his message to his potential
voters, the candidate is forced to also pay for the delivery of his message, among others, to all New
Yorkers (who do not belong to his political district). Conversely, if a candidate of, say, Alabama,
wants to deliver his message to all the potential voters in his state, he would be forced to purchase
time in not one but nine DMAs, while a candidate of, say, Utah, would only have to purchase
time in one DMA. This examples illustrate that the degree of fragmentation of the media markets
varies enormously across states. One could argue that, to the extent that CPM reects the cost per
percentage point of the marketsaudience, fragmentation is not really a problem. To see why this
could be argued, note that if the nine DMAs within Alabama were merged into one big DMA, then
the CPM of this big DMA would approximately equal the sum of the nine smaller DMAs, since by
construction CPM accounts for the size of the population of its media market. Following this line
of thinking, a possible measure of the cost of political advertising would be the sum of CPMs across
all DMAs within a political district. Such approach has been taken by Ansolabehere et al. (2001).
However, one could posit the following concerns.
Consider the case of Alabama. As we said, there are nine DMAs that extend across over this state.
One of them is the expensive DMA of Atlanta, which spans over two counties of Alabama: Clebune
and Randolph. Combined, these two counties only sum up to 0.8 % of Alabamas population. Would
political candidates running for an Alabamas seat pay the cost of advertising in the expensive Atlanta
TV market just to reach a 0.8 % of Alabamas voters? Most likely not. The candidates will nd more
28This data corresponds to the day part known as late news, and comes from Media Market Guide (2004).
29The choice of 2004 is because this year is the median of the three electoral cycles pooled in the data (2002, 2004
and 2006). The choice of late news is because this is the day part in which most political ads are aired. Similar results
can be obtained using prime time. The choice of the second quarter is arbitrary.
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convenient to use the same money to purchase extra TV time in, say, the DMA of Birmingham TV
market, which spans over several counties that sum up to more than 39% of Alabamas population,
at a cost that equals 20% of the cost of Atlantas cost. This example illustrates that, even when
CPM adjusts for the population within its DMA market, a large part of the population within a
DMA may correspond to a political district di¤erent than the one in which the candidate is running.
To deal with this kind of problems, in their study of U.S. House races, Ansolabehere et al. (2001)
considered, as additional measures of the cost of political advertising, the cost of reaching not the
total of the voters, but a certain proportion, say 60 %. However, this approach creates a new
dilemma. Namely, how is this 60 % obtained? One possibility is to start with the most inexpensive
markets and move progressively to the most expensive ones. It seems to us that, although appealing
from an economic perspective, this approach fails to take into account that in reality politicians tend
to concentrate in a few media markets. These few media markets tend to be highly correlated with
the most populated districts (which are usually not the most inexpensive ones). Moreover, there
are good reasons to think that the most inexpensive media markets may correspond to the most
"partisan" districts (i.e., the ones with small proportion of issue-oriented voters relative to party-
oriented voters), and therefore, the least appealing for issue-related advertising. (Such is the class
of ads relevant to our study). Hence, a plausible alternative approach is to calculate the, say, 60 %
of the states population starting with the largest markets and moving progressively to the smaller
markets. This approach would capture the fact that Senate campaigns usually focus on the main
city (or cities) of each state. Finally, irrespective of how we calculate this fraction of the population,
some problems will still arise. To start with, the proportion of the population needs to be arbitrarily
set. Why not 20, 40 or 80 % instead of 60%? Even more: why even assuming a constant percentage
across states? The implications of a 60% threshold are not the same for, say New York (where the
population is highly concentrated in one TV market) than for, say, Alabama, where the population
is widespread across the state. For instance, a 60% threshold uniform across states would imply
that political candidates in New York devote all their attention to the most educated citizens of that
state, while political candidates in Alabama devote most of their resources to second, third-tier and
even fourth-tier counties in terms of the level of education of its inhabitants. Since di¤erent degrees
of education may be highly correlated with level of political partisanship and issue-oriented voting,
this may play an important role in our analysis. For instance, it is likely that Alabamas candidates
do not attempt to convince voters of low-density population with issue-oriented TV ads. Forcing the
percentage of population constant across states will implicitly make the assumption that they do.
To bypass at least some of these problems, our approach consists in using the CPM of the DMA
that spans over the most populated county of a state as the measure of the cost of political advertising
for that particular state. Then, for example, since Kings is the most populated county within the
state of New York, and because the DMA market that spans over Kings is the New York DMA, we
use the CPM that corresponds to New York DMA as our measure of the cost of political advertising
for the state of New York. Similarly, since the most populated county in Alabama is Je¤erson, and
because the DMA that spans over Je¤erson is Birmingham, we use the CPM that corresponds to
Birmingham as our cost measure for Alabama. Throughout, we refer to our construction of the cost
of political advertising as the TV cost index.
We make clear that the TV cost index is not meant to be a valid measure in abstract, but in
particular for the empirical implication of our theoretical model. First, this measure is not meant
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to summarize, in any way, the total cost of political advertising across states. Instead, it is meant
to summarize one particular component of this total cost: the cost of reaching issue-oriented voters.
As the literature suggests, political ads may or not be issue-oriented, and the population target for
each of these types of ads need not be the same. There are good reasons to think that issue-oriented
ads are more likely to be aired on urban rather than rural areas. If, instead, we calculated the TV
cost index as the sum across counties within a particular state, we would be implicitly assuming that
a candidate running for, say, Missouri, has the same level of concern that his issue position would
be misinterpreted in St. Louis county (liberal district, home of world-wide renowned universities)
than in, say, Macon county (which only has 15,700 inhabitants). Second, this measure of TV cost
index is not meant to summarize, in any way, the average measure of the CPM of the DMAs within
each state, for similar reasons. Third, this measure of TV cost index does not intend to reect the
degree of TV market fragmentation of each state. This is because (i) it is usually the case that
campaigns focus in (if they do not restrict to) the most populated counties, and (ii) the degree of
fragmentation of a particular state is likely to be only weakly correlated to the number of DMAs
market within a state in which issue-oriented ads are aired. Fourth, ideally, in order to test our
model, one would like to count with a measure of TV cost index that be a weighted sum of all
DMAs within each state, where the weights would be given by some proxy of the degree to which:
(i) the candidates may campaign in that particular market, (ii) the degree to which the voters of
that market are issue-oriented instead of party-oriented. However, it is not clear that such measure
would yield results signicantly di¤erent than the ones given by our measure of TV cost as the CPM
of the most populated county. Also, the construction of this "ideal" measure, which is a very heavy
task, would rely on highly subjective appreciations.
Previous studies have used di¤erent measures of the cost of political advertising. In particular,
Campbell et al. (1984) and Stewart and Reynolds (1990) address the question of whether higher
TV costs increase the incumbency advantage. These papers use measures (such as fragmentation)
of how well political districts match media markets. Since for their theoretical model issue-oriented
ads and non issue-oriented oriented ads may be considered substitutes, their measure of market is
appropriate. The work of Ansolabehere et al. (2001) address the question of whether TV advertising
prices are to blame for the increase in campaign expenditure in the last three decades. Accordingly,
they calculate the cost of political advertising as the sum across DMAs within each state to reach (i)
1%, (ii) 50%, (iii) 66% and (iv) 100% of the states population. The pros and cons of this approach
have been discussed above. Note that the three papers use measures di¤erent than ours in order to
address questions di¤erent than ours. For the sake of comparison, in addition to using the CPM of
the most populated county as a proxy of the TV cost index of political advertising in issue-oriented
districts, we also calculate an alternative measure, namely the sum of CPMs across the counties
that sum up to certain percentages of the states population. We discard the measures of political
advertising that rely exclusively on the match between political districts and media markets because
(i) Ansolabehere et al. (2001) nd no strong correlation between these measures and actual costs,
and (ii) as we already noted, accounting for market fragmentation may not be a good idea when we
want to measure the cost of political advertising in districts where votes are primarily issue-oriented.
Finally, we use the following control variables: incumbency, open seat, party of the candidate and
whether the candidate won the election, median income by state and a dummy variable for the year
2006 (we did not control for the years 2004 and 2002 because of the small number of observations for
32
each of these years). Median income by state has been obtained from US Census data; the source
for the remaining controls is Wikipedia. Table 1 in Appendix E provides the summary statistics for
the dependent variable and di¤erent versions of the TV cost index that will be used throughout.
7.2 The Model and Results
We regress the probit model
Pr(NPAT = 1jCPP;X) = (0; 1CPP;X);
where  () denotes the standard Normal cumulative distribution function.
In this equation, the dependent variable NPAT may take two values: 0 represents F(ailed NPAT),
and 1 represents P(assed NPAT), in the last election run by the candidate. The coe¢ cient we are
interested in is 1; which captures the e¤ect that an increase in the TV cost index produces in the
probability that NPAT = 1. Our theory suggests that there must be a negative correlation between
the TV cost index and the probability of announcing position: the larger the cost of the PA technology
(which allows the candidates to minimize the degree of ambiguity in the interpretation of their
announcements), the more likely the candidates will not announce policy. As we already discussed,
we measure the TV cost index for a given state as (the logarithms of) the CPP corresponding to
the DMA that spans over the most populated county within that state. (See the examples of states
of Alabama and New York in the previous subsection.) The vector  and the covariates X are in
bold type to emphasize that they are, respectively, a vector and a matrix. The covariates X are the
control variables and  is the associated vector of coe¢ cients. Controls are as follows. Democrat
Party is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the candidate represents the Democrat party and
0 otherwise. Incumbent is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the candidate is an incumbent in
the election he is running for, and 0 otherwise. Open seat is a dummy variable that takes value 1
if the candidate is running for an open seat, and 0 otherwise . Year 2006 is a dummy variable that
takes value 1 if the candidate is running for the 2006 Senate election, and 0 otherwise.30 Vote share
democrats represents the vote share of the Democrats in the election run by the candidate in that
particular observation. This variable aims at capturing closeness between the candidates.
30Note that 0 represents either the 2004 Senate election or the 2002 Senate election.
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Table 2
Probit Estimates for Announcement of Platform, U.S. Senate Races
Pr(NPAT= passed)
TV cost index
 0:27
[0:12]
Democrat party
 0:64
[0:26]
Incumbent
 0:30
[0:31]
Open seat
 0:60
[0:42]
Year 2006
 0:02
[0:27]
Vote share democrats
0:00
[0:01]
Constant
1:38
[0:73]
N 129
Pseudo R-squared 0:09
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%.
The TV cost index equals log(CPP).
We refer the reader to Table 2. As our theory suggests, the TV cost index, which equals log(CPP ),
exhibits a coe¢ cient of negative sign. This coe¢ cient is statistically signicant at the 5 % level.
Among the control variables, the only statistically signicant coe¢ cient is Democratic party. The
regression shows, then, that the probability that a U.S. Senate candidate makes a clear stand on
his platform decreases (i) with the cost of TV advertising in his district, (ii) conditional on the
candidate being a Democrat. Before addressing point (i), which is of utmost relevance for us, let us
make some comments regarding point (ii). Since Project Vote Smart is a non-partisan organization
committed to political impartiality, it is one of its policies that "[a]ll Founding Board members have
an ideological opposite to provide balance and ensure strict impartiality." This implies that the ratio
of republicans to democrats is close to one. However, because our empirical analysis is restricted to
the US Senate, a plausible concern is that, among PVS Founding Board members, there are actually
more republican Senators than democrat Senators. If this were the case, we may conclude that the
lower probability of announcement conditional on the candidate representing the Democrat party
may be the result of PVS members having more resources (contacts) to urge the political candidates
to take the NPAT. Indeed, we checked that, within PVS Founding Board members, there are ve
republican U.S. senators and only two democratic U.S. senators. This suggests that the statistically
signicance of the coe¢ cient of the covariate Democratic party might be due to a sample bias.
Most important to us is the coe¢ cient associated to the TV cost index. This coe¢ cient is
negative, statistically signicant at 5% level and robust to minor modications of the regression. To
check the robustness, we proceed as follows. First, we regress the model omitting each of the control
variables one at a time, and no substantial changes occur. Second, we regress the model omitting
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two variables and three variables at a time. Again, no substantial changes occur.
In order to challenge our results, one could think of two alternative theories to explain why
candidates may opt not to announce positions. A rst plausible theory is that the candidates become
more and more willing to announce position as the race becomes closer and closer. This theory nds
no support in our estimation, since the coe¢ cient associated to vote share democrats is zero.31 A
second plausible theory is that the candidates become more and more willing to announce position as
they run for seats in states with higher and higher levels of education. Although we did not include
education level as a covariate in our analysis, we did check for median income by states, which should
be highly correlated with education level. The result is that median income is negative correlated to
the probability of announcing position, what indicates that neither this theory nds support in our
analysis. After observing the results in Table 2, the negative coe¢ cient of median income should be
no surprise, since median income and TV cost index are expected to be highly correlated (and they
are: correlation is 0.64). We did not include median income in the regression reported in Table 2
since its negative sign provides strong evidence that median income (and therefore the educational
level) is not an omitted variable driving the results. (Of course, due to its collinearity with TV cost
index, the standard deviation of the coe¢ cient associated to the latter variable is a¤ected when the
two variables are included in the regression.)
In Table 2, it can be observed that N = 129; this is because we drop the two observations
corresponding to Alaska, since the DMAs are not assigned for some counties within this state. The
fact that we do not aim to maximize explanatory power but to test a specic relation between two
variables may explain the relatively low R2. A feature of probit models is that the omission of
relevant variables tends to inate the standard deviations of the coe¢ cients even when the omitted
variables are not correlated with the covariates (Cramer, 2003). This suggests that signicance levels
in Table 2 may be too conservative. This, together with the low R2, implies that in a fully specied
model, 1 may be signicant even at levels lower than 5 %. Similar considerations follow from the
small size of the sample.
To give an idea of the marginal e¤ect of the TV cost index on the probability of passing the
NPAT test, consider two Senators running for a seat in the U.S. Senate: one for Alabama (TV cost
index: 110) and the other for Massachusetts (TV cost index: 569). Assume that both represent the
Republican party and are running for an open seat in the 2006 election. Also, set the vote share of
the democratic party at the sample mean, 48%. From our regression, it follows that the probability
of passing the NPAT is 14 percentage points higher for the candidate from Alabama than for the
candidate from Massachusetts.
7.2.1 Alternative measures of the cost of political advertising
As we already discussed, the choice of a measure of the cost of political advertising may be debat-
able. In this section we consider a di¤erent measure, closer, but not identical, to the one used in
Ansolabehere et al. (2001). This measure denes the TV cost index as the sum, within each state,
of as many DMAs as needed in order to reach a certain percentage of the population of that state.
From now on, we refer to this percentage of the population as the population threshold. Our new
measure of cost of political advertising equals the sum of the CPP of the DMAs that span over the
31Similar results are obtained when the square of vote share democrats is used.
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most populated counties of the state, until the population threshold is reached. For example, suppose
the threshold is 30 %. In the case of Alabama, the cost of reaching 30% of the population is equal
to the cost of advertising in the DMAs of Birmingham, Mobile-Pensacola and Huntsville-Decatur,
since, altogether, these three DMAs span over the 30% of Alabamas population, and they cover the
most populated counties.
We consider several population thresholds in the range 1%-100%. In every case, the sign of the
coe¢ cient of the TV cost index was negative, which is consistent with the empirical implication of our
theoretical model. However, in general, as the population threshold increases, the p-value associated
to this coe¢ cient increases. For small values, approximately up to 10%, we obtained similar results
than using the CPP of the DMAs that covers the most populated county within the state (that is,
than the results reported in Table 2). For a threshold close to 15%, the level of signicance drops
to 10%. For some value of the population threshold between 10% and 20%, the level of signicance
drops to more than 10%, implying that we can no longer reject the null that 1 is equal to zero. As
we move beyond the 20% population threshold, the p-value keeps increasing. Following we provide
our interpretation of this pattern.
As we already discussed, the empirical implication of our theoretical model is that candidates
will be more likely to announce positions whenever they believe that issue-oriented voters are less
likely to misinterpret their issue announcements. TV market fragmentation increases the cost of
advertising because, in order to reach small towns or rural districts, the candidate needs to advertise
in several DMAs in addition to the DMAs that cover the main cities of the state. Such extra cost
will be more and more reected in the TV cost index as we set the population threshold higher
and higher. Importantly, although such extra cost reects the fact that the candidates reach more
voters, the latter come from increasingly smaller, more rural areas, whose population is presumably
less educated. In contrast, when the TV index is constructed so that only the DMA that covers the
most populated county is considered, the e¤ect of market fragmentation, and therefore of the voters
that are more likely to cast their vote based on partisan considerations (vis à vis issue-position
considerations), is minimized. This suggests that, when making strategic decisions like whether
or not to announce positions, the candidates are sophisticated in the sense that their cost-benet
analysis weights the districts within the state in order to account for their share of issue-oriented
voters.
8 Conclusion
Previous impossibility results found that, in a robust equilibrium, rational candidates will always
prefer to announce position. We developed a model with the novel feature that the voters may
misinterpret the announcements made by the candidates. Within this model, we investigated several
di¤erent specications of the model, namely: expected utility candidates, ambiguity averse candi-
dates, two-candidate elections, multi-candidate elections, candidates that maximize expected vote
share and candidates that maximize expected probability of vote.
We showed that, in this model, the impossibility theorems are overcome. Moreover, this result is
robust to any of the mentioned changes in the specication of the model. The probability that the
candidates do not announce in equilibrium depends on the distance between the mean of the voters
beliefs regarding the policy that a candidate that wins without announcement will implement and
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the ideal point of the median voter. As this distance decreases, the likelihood of robust non-salience
is increased.
Finally, we estimated a probit model that supports a testable implication of our model. An-
solabehere et al. (2001) infer that the cost structure faced by the candidates has a substantive
impact on the mediatic strategy of political campaigns. Our empirical work shows that the impact
of the cost structure goes even further, since it a¤ects key electoral strategies such as whether or not
to make clear stands on important issues.
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8.1 Appendix A: Restricted Best Responses with Expected Utility inM(D; 0; 2(s))
Throughout, vc;l and vc;r are shortcuts for the expected vote share of candidate c conditional on
the leftist and rightist realization of noise, respectively. We restrict our attention to M(D; 0; 2(s))
that is, there is only noise in the interpretation of candidate 2s announcement. Hence, while,
say, v2;l represents the vote share of candidate 2 when the state of the world that determines the
votersinterpretation of his own announcement is l(eft), v1;l represents the vote of candidate 1 when
the state of the world that determines the votersinterpretation of his opponents announcement is
l(eft): We drop the subindex c in vc;r whenever the context avoids confusion. We use m to denote
the ideal point of the median voter.
Also, we use ebc(d c) to denote candidate cs best response to candidates  c strategy d c in the
restricted model M(D; 0; 2(s)). (We save bc(d c) to denote the best response in the unrestricted
models.) Hence, ebc : D f;g ! D f;g. Accordingly, we refer to ebc(d c) as candidate cs restricted
best response to d c.
Consider the following mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive cases: (i) ebc(d c)  d c+;
(ii) ebc(d c)  d c   ; and (iii) d c +  > ebc(d c) > d c   : Following, for M(D; 0; 2(s)), we
characterize the restricted best response ebc(d c) for each of these three cases.
8.1.1 Candidate 1
Case (i): eb1(d2)  d2 + 
(i.a) Consider any d2 such that d2 +  < m: A simple separation argument shows thateb1(d2) = d2 +  + ; and that vl = 1   	(d2) and vr = 1   	(d2 + ) : Combined with ql = qr = 12 ;
this implies that
V1(eb1(d2); d2) = 1  1
2
	 (d2)  1
2
	 (d2 + )
And, in the case 	~U [0; 1];
V1(eb1(d2); d2) = vlql + vrqr = 1  d2   1
2

(i.b) Consider any d2 such that d2 +   m: A simple separation argument shows thateb1(d2) = d2 + ; and that vl = 1 	(d2) and vr = 12 ; so that
V (eb1(d2); d2) = 3
4
  1
2
	 (d2)
And, in the case 	~U [0; 1];
V1(eb1(d2); d2) = 3
4
  1
2
d2
Irrespective of the specic form that 	 takes, it follows that candidate 1s best response is
d1 = d2 +  +  if 12 > 	(d2 + ) and d1 = d2 +  otherwise.
Case (ii): eb1(d2)  d2   
(ii.a) Consider any d2 such that d2    > m: A simple separation argument shows thateb1(d2) = d2   ( + ), that vl = 	(d2   ) and vr = 	(d2) : This implies that
V1(eb1(d2); d2) = 1
2
	 (d2   ) + 1
2
	 (d2)
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And, in the case 	~U [0; 1];
V1(eb1(d2); d2) = d2   1
2
:
(ii.b) Consider any d2 such that d2     m: A simple separation argument shows thateb1(d2) = d2   ; and that vl = 12 and vr = 	(d2) ; so that
V1(eb1(d2); d2) = 1
4
+
1
2
	 (d2)
And, in the case 	~U [0; 1];
V1(eb1(d2); d2) = 1
2
d2 +
1
4
Irrespective of the specic form that 	 takes, it follows that candidate 1s best response is
d1 = d2   ( + ) if 	(d2   )  12 ; and d1 = d2    otherwise.
Case (iii): d2 +  > eb1(d2) > d2   
In this case, vl = 1 	

d1+d2 
2

and vr = 	

d1+d2+
2

: Hence,
V1(d1; d2) =
1
2
  1
2

	

d1 + d2   
2

 	

d1 + d2 + 
2

And, in the case 	~U [0; 1];
V1(d1; d2) =
1
2
+
1
2

Note that, for 	~U [0; 1], V1(d1; d2) is independent of d1 and d2. Any d1 2 [d2   ; d2 + ] gives the
exact same expected utility, namely V1(d1; d2) = 12 +

2 :
8.1.2 Candidate 2
(i) Case d1 +   eb2(d1)
(i.a) Consider any d1 such that d1 < m: A simple separation argument shows that eb2(d2) =
d1 +  + ; and that vl = 1 	(d1) ; vr = 1 	(d1 + ) :
This implies that
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = 1  1
2
[	 (d1) + 	 (d1 + )] :
And, in the case 	~U [0; 1];
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = 1  d1   1
2
: (9)
(i.b) Consider any d1 such that d1  m: A simple separation argument shows that eb2(d1) =
d1 + ; and that vl = 12 and vr = 1 	(d1 + ) :
This implies that
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = 3
4
  1
2
	 (d1 + )
And, in the case 	~U [0; 1];
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = 3
4
  1
2
d1   1
2
 (10)
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Irrespective of the specic form that 	 takes, it follows that eb2(d2) = d1 +  +  dominateseb2(d1) = d1 +  for any d1 < m: If d1 = m; candidate 2 is indi¤erent between them and, for any
d1 > m; eb2(d1) = d1 +  dominates eb2(d2) = d1 +  + .
Case (ii) d1     eb2(d1)
(ii.a) Consider any d1 such that d1 > m: A simple separation argument shows that eb2(d1) =
d1   ( + ), and that vl = 	(d1   ) and vr = 	(d1) :
This implies that
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = 1
2
	 (d1   ) + 1
2
	 (d1)
And, in the case 	~U [0; 1];
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = d1   1
2
: (11)
(ii.b) Consider any d1 such that d1  m: A simple separation argument shows that eb2(d1) =
d1   ; and that vl = 	(d1   ) and vr = 12 :
This implies that
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = 1
2
	 (d1   ) + 1
4
And, in the case 	~U [0; 1];
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = 1
2
d1   1
2
 +
1
4
(12)
Irrespective of the specic form that 	 takes, it follows that eb2(d1) = d1   ( + ) dominateseb2(d1) = d1    for any d1 > m. If d1 = m; candidate 2 is indi¤erent between them and, for any
d1 < m; eb2(d1) = d1    dominates eb2(d1) = d1   ( + ).
Case (iii): d1 +  > eb2(d1) > d1   
In this case, vl = 	

d1+d2 
2

and vr = 1 	

d1+d2+
2

: This implies that
V2(v2(d2; d1)) =
1
2
  1
2

	

d1 + d2 + 
2

 	

d1 + d2   
2

And, in the case 	~U [0; 1];
V2(v2(d2; d1)) =
1
2
  1
2

In this case, when 	~U [0; 1]; V2(v2(d2; d1)) is independent of d1 and d2; implying that any an-
nouncement d2 such that jd1   d2j <  gives candidate 2 the same utility.
8.2 Appendix B: Best Response Correspondences with Variational Preferences
We assume throughout that there are only two states: left (l) and right (r), and that the reference
distribution for these states is ql = qr = 12 :
We focus on the optimal behavior of a generic candidate, and adopt the following notational
shortcuts: vs  vc (d1; d2js) and pc;s  ps for any s 2 S: From Appendix C, the medias optimal
probabilities become
pr =
1
8
(4 + vl   vr)
pl =
1
8
(vr   vl   4) + 1
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if  >
vr vl
4
 ; pr = 1 if  < vl vr4 ; and pr = 0 if  < vr vl4 . To avoid dealing with the degenerate
cases, we restrict our attention to  >
vr vl
4
.
8.2.1 The restricted best response correspondence of Candidate 1
In this subsection, we characterize the restricted best response correspondence of the candidates,ebc(d c), in the model M(D; 0; 2(s)).
(i) Case eb1(d2)  d2 + 
(i.a) Consider any d2 such that d2 +  < m:
Since eb1(d2)  d2 + ; it must follow that vl = 1   d2 +d12 and vr = 1   d2++d12 : Let
p  argminpc2(q)
 R
vc(dc; d c)dpc +  (pcjjq)

, with p = (pl ; p

r): From Appendix C, p

r =
1
8 (4 + vl   vr) and pl = 18 (vr   vl   4) + 1. Since 2 (pjjq) 
R
S
p(s)2
q(s)   1ds is strictly convex, it
follows that the variational preference functional is everywhere di¤erentiable (see Maccheroni et al.,
2005). For all d1 such that d1 > d2 + ; @V@d1 =  12 ; implying that V1(v1(d1; d2)) decreases monoton-
ically in d1 in the interval (d2 + ; 1]: Since d2 +  < m; V1(v1(d2 + ; d2)) < V1(v1(d2 +  + ; d2)),
where  is an innitesimal scalar. It follows that eb1(d2) = d2 +  + : Replacing eb1(d2) in vl and vr
above, we get that vl = 1  d2 and vr = 1  d2   : Combined with ql = qr = 12 ; this implies that
V (v1(eb1(d2); d2)) = vlpl + vrpr + p2l
ql
+
p2r
qr
  1

or
V (v1(eb1(d2); d2)) = 1  d2   1
2
   1
16
2 (13)
(i.b) Consider any d2 such that d2 +   m:
For all d1 such that d1 > d2 + ; @V@d1 =  12 ; implying that V1(v1(d1; d2)) decreases monotonically
in d1 in the interval (d2 + ; 1]: Since d2 +   m; V1(v1(d2 + ; d2)) > V1(v1(d2 +  + ; d2)), where
 is an innitesimal scalar. It follows that eb1(d2) = d2 + ; and that vl = 1  d2 and vr = 12 , so that
V (eb1(d2); d2) = (1  d2) pl + 12pr +  p2l1
2
+ p
2
r
1
2
  1

; which gives
V (v1(eb1(d2); d2)) = 3
4
  1
2
d2 +
1
16
d2   1
16
d22  
1
64
(14)
A comparison of Expressions 13 and 14 indicates that V (d2 +  + ; d2)  V (d2 + ; d2) for any
d2  m  :
(ii) Case eb1(d2)  d2   
(ii.a) Consider any d2 such that d2    > m: This case is symmetric to case (i.a). Then,eb1(d2) = d2   ( + ), vl = d2   ; vr = d2; and
V (v1(eb1(d2); d2)) = d2   1
2
   1
16
2 (15)
(ii.b) Consider any d2 such that d2     m: This case is symmetric to case (i.b). Then,eb1(d2) = d2   ; and that vl = 12 , vr = d2 , so that
V (v1(eb1(d2); d2)) = 1
4
+
1
2
d2 +
1
16
d2   1
16
d22  
1
64
: (16)
A simple comparison of Expressions 15 and 16 indicates that candidate 1s best response iseb1(d2) = d2   ( + ) when d2 > m+ :
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(iii) Case
eb1(d2)  d2 < 
In this case, vl = 1  d1+d2 2 and vr = d1+d2+2 : Hence,
V (v1(d1; d2)) =
1
2
+
1
2
 +
1
8

d1 + d2   d1d2   1
2
d21  
1
2
d22  
1
2

(17)
The FOC is
1
8
(1  d2   d1) = 0
and the SOC is
  1
8
 0:
Note that the FOC implies that
d1 = 1  d2; (18)
and the SOC implies that for any nite , d1 is a global maximum. For  " 1; the strict concavity of
V (v1(d1; d2)) is lost, and any d1 2 [d2 ; d2+] gives the exact same V; namely V (v1(d1; d2)) = 12+ 2 :
Plugging in Expression 18 in Equation 17 yields
V (v1(d

1(d2); d2)) =
1
2
+
1
2

8.2.2 The restricted best response correspondence of Candidate 2
(i) Case eb2(d1)  (d1 + ) > 0
(i.a) Consider any eb2(d1) such that eb2(d1)+ < m: Then, vl = 1  d1+d2 2 ; vr = 1  d1+d2+2 :
The problem is symmetric to that of candidate 1, case (i.a). Then, eb2(d1) = d1 + ( + ) and
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = 1  d1   1
2
   1
16
2 (19)
(i.b) Consider the case in which eb2(d1) +   m: A simple separation argument shows thateb2(d1) = d1 + : This implies that vl = 12 , vr = 1  d1    so that
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = 3
4
  1
2
d1   1
2
 +
1
16
   1
64
+
1
16
d1   1
8
d1   1
16
2   1
16
d21 (20)
A simple comparison of Expressions 19 and 20 indicates that eb2(d1) = d1 + ( + ) is the best
response of candidate 2 when d1  12 :
(ii) Case (d1   ) eb2(d1) > 0
(ii.a) Consider any eb2(d1) such that eb2(d1)    > m: The problem is symmetric to that of
candidate 1 case (ii.a). Then, vl =
d1+d2 
2 , vr =
d1+d2+
2 ;
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = d1   1
2
   1
16
2 (21)
and eb2(d1) = d1   ( + ),
Now, consider the case in which eb2(d1)     m: A simple separation argument shows thateb2(d1) = d1   ; and that vl = d1    , vr = 12 so that
V (v2(eb2(d1); d1)) = 1
2
d1   1
2
 +
1
4
  1
64
  1
16
 +
1
16
d1 +
1
8
d1   1
16
d21 (22)
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A simple comparison of Expressions 21 and 22 indicates that the best response of candidate 2 iseb2(d1) = d1   ( + ) when d1 > 12 ; otherwise the best response is eb2(d1) = d1   :
(iii) Case
eb2(d1)  d1 < 
A simple separation argument shows that vl =
d1+d2 
2 and vr = 1  d1+d2+2 : It follows that
V (v2(d2; d1)) =
1
2
  1
2
 +
1
8

d1 + d2   d1d2   1
2
d21  
1
2
d22  
1
2

(23)
The FOC implies
d2 = 1  d1 (24)
and the SOC implies that, for any nite , d2 is a global maximum. For  " 1; the strict
concavity of V (d1; d2) is lost, and any d2 such that d1 2 [d2   ; d2 + ] gives V (v2(d1; d2)) = 12   2 :
Plugging in Expression 24 in Equation 23 yields V (v2(d2(d1); d1)) =
1
2   12:
8.3 Appendix C: Deriving Probability p
First note that (t)  12(t   1)2 is strictly convex, so that the divergence 2 (pjjq) 
R
S
p(s)2
q(s)   1ds
is strictly convex and then, the variational preference functional is everywhere di¤erentiable (see
Maccheroni et al., 2005). We now look for pc 2 argminpc2(q)
 R
vc(sjdc; d c)dpc + 2 (pcjjq)

: In
our case, S = fl; rg, denoting leftist bias, and rightist bias, respectively. So,
2 (pjjq)  p
2
l
ql
+
p2r
qr
  1: (25)
The rst order condition for minpc2(q)
 R
vc(sjdc; d c)dpc + 2 (pcjjq)

are vl + 
2pl
ql
= k; vr +
 2prqr = k and pl + pr = 1: It then follows that
vl   vr = 2

pr
qr
  pl
ql

;
Using pl + pr = 1; we obtain
vl   vr = 2
qlqr
(qlpr   qr + prqr) ;
Solving this system of equations yields
pl =
1
2ql + 2qr
(qlqrvr   qlvlqr   2qr) + 1
pr =
1
2ql + 2qr
(2qr + qlvlqr   qlqrvr) :
Specialized to ql = 12 qr =
1
2 , the system reduces to
(pl ; p

r) =
8><>:
 
1
8 (vr   vl   4) + 1; 18 (4 + vl   vr)

if   jvr vlj4
(0; 1) if  < vl vr4
(1; 0) if  < vr vl4
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8.4 Appendix D: Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 7. Since candidates are identical, it su¢ ces to check for candidate, say
2. First, assume that 1(l) = 2(l): Since 1(l) =  2(r) and 1(r) =  2(l); it follows that
1(r) = 2(r): Since candidates are identical and adopt identical positions, it must follow that
V2(m:m) =
1
2 : Second, assume that 1(l) 6= 2(l): Since 1(l) =  2(r) and 1(r) =  2(l); it follows
that 1(r) 6= 2(r): W.l.o.g. assume that 2(l) < 1(l); so that 2(r) < 1(r) (since both 1(l) and
2(l) are negative). In this case,
V (m;m) =
1
4
	

d2 + 2(l) + d1 + 1(l)
2

+
1
4

1 	

d2 + 2(r) + d1 + 1(l)
2

+
1
4
	

d2 + 2(l) + d1 + 1(r)
2

+
1
4
	

d2 + 2(r) + d1 + 1(r)
2

:
Using 1(l) =  2(r) and 1(r) =  2(l), the latter expression reduces to V (m;m) = 14 +
1
4
h
	

m+1(l)+2(l)
2

+	

m+1(r)+2(r)
2
i
: Symmetry of 	 su¢ ces to reduce the latter expression to
V2(m;m) =
1
2 : We proceed now to check that no deviation is protable.
The following cases are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive: (a) d2 such that i2(d2; l) <
i2(d2; r) < i1(m; l); (b) d2 such that i2(d2; l) < i2(d2; r) = i1(m; l); (c) d2 such that i2(d2; l) <
i1(m; l) < i2(d2; r) < i1(m; r); (d) d2 such that i2(d2; l) = i1(m; l) < i2(d2; r) = i1(m; r); (e) d2
such that i1(m; l) < i2(d2; l) < i1(m; r) < i2(d2; r); (f) d2 such that i1(m; l) < i2(d2; l) = i1(m; r) <
i2(d2; r); (g) i1(m; l) < i1(m; r) < i2(d2; l) < i2(d2; r): A simple separation argument shows that the
only possibly protable deviations from (m;m) are cases (c), (d) and (e). Since cases (c) and (e) are
symmetric, it su¢ ces to check for cases (c) and (d). For any d2 that satises case (c), it follows that
V2(d
case_c
2 ;m) =
1
4
	

d2 +m+ 1(l) + 2(l)
2

+
1
4

1 	

m+ d2 + 2(r) + 1(l)
2

+
1
4
	

m+ d2 + 2(l) + 1(r)
2

+
1
4
	

m+ d2 + 1(r) + 2(r)
2

The latter expression reduces to V2(d
case_c
2 ;m) =
1
4+
1
4
h
	

m+d2+1(l)+2(l)
2

+	

m+d2+1(r)+2(r)
2
i
:
Symmetry of 	 implies that V2(d
case_c
2 ;m) <
1
2 for any d2 < m: For any d2 that satises case (d), it
follows that
V2(d
case_d
2 ;m) =
1
4
1
2
+
1
4

1 	

d2 +m+ 1(l) + 2(r)
2

+
1
4
	

m+ d2 + 1(r) + 2(l)
2

+
1
4
	

m+ d2 + 1(r) + 2(r)
2

The latter expression reduces to V2(d
case_d
2 ;m) =
1
2 : Hence, V2(d2;m)  V2(m;m) for any d2 2 D and
V2(d2;m) = V2(m;m) if and only if d2 is such that i2(d2; l) = i1(m; l) < i2(d2; r) = i1(m; r): It remains
to check that V2(;;m) < V2(m;m) for  such that  < m+1(l) < m+1(r) or  > m+1(r) > m+
1(l): Consider  < m+1(l) < m+1(r): In this case, V2(;;m) = 12	

m++1(l)
2

+ 12	

m++1(r)
2

:
It follows that V2(;;m) < 12 i¤	

m++1(l)
2

+	

m++1(r)
2

> 1. Clearly, this condition is satised
for any + 1(r) < m, for any 1(r) 6= 0: Similar reasoning applies for  > m+ 1(r) > m+ 1(l):
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Proof of Proposition 8. Assume that  < m (the case   m is analogous) Since the
model is M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) and the parameters are assumed to be identical across candidates,
it su¢ ces to check the value of the parameters for which no deviation from (;; ;) is protable for
candidate, say, 2. By construction, V2(;; ;) = 12 : By construction, for any d2 2 D, V2(d2; ;) in
M(D[f;g; 1(s); 2(s)) is equal to V2(d2; ) in M(D[f;g; 0; 2(s)). Then, we can use the restricted
best response correspondence of candidate 2 for M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)) (in Appendix A) to check if
there is any d2 2 D such that V2(d2; ) > V2(;; ): From Appendix A, only three deviations may
be protable: (i) dcase_i2 () =  +  + ; which gives V2(d
case_i
2 (); ) = 1   12 [	 () + 	 ( + )] ;
(ii) dcase_ii2 () =    ( + ); which gives V2(dcase_ii2 (); ) = 12	(   ) + 14 ; (iii) d
case_iii
2 () 2
(+ ;   ) which gives V2(dcase_iii2 (); ) = 12   12
h
	

+d2+
2

 	

+d2 
2
i
: The prole (;; ;) is
an equilibrium for the values of the parameters such that 12 is strictly greater than each of these values.
We proceed case by case. Case (i): 12 > 1   12 [	 () + 	 ( + )] reduces to 	( + ) > 1   	() :
Since   m and   0; this condition is satised: (i) for a xed  > 0; for values of  close
enough to m, (ii) for a xed ; for values of  large enough. Case (ii): 12 >
1
2	(   ) + 14 reduces
to 12 > 	(   ) : Since   m and  > 0; this condition is trivially satised. Case (iii): 12 >
1
2   12
h
	

+d2+
2

 	

+d2 
2
i
reduces to 	

+d2+
2

> 	

+d2 
2

: Since  > 0, this condition
is trivially satised. Hence, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for  < m can be written as
	( + ) > 1 	() : Applying the same line of reasoning, for   m, 1 	() > 	(   ) : It follows
that the necessary and su¢ cient condition can be summarized as 	( + ) > 1 	() > 	(   ) :
Proof of Proposition 5. For candidate 1, V1(;; d2) = V1(; d2) for any d2 2 D[f;g: Then, in
an equilibrium in which at least one candidate strictly prefers not to announce position, d2 = ;: Since
the model is M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)) and d2 = ;; the vote shares of the candidates are deterministic
and perfectly spatial. Hence, a simple separation argument shows that d1(;) =  +  is candidate
1s best response. A necessary condition for candidate 2 to strictly prefer ; is that V2(dcase_i2 ( +
);  + ) < V2(;;  + ) (see Appendix A). V2(dcase_i2 ( + );  + ) = 1   12 [	 () + 	 ( + )] ;
and V2(;;  + ) = 	 () : After some algebra, V2(dcase_i2 ( + );  + ) < V2(;;  + ) reduces to
2	 () + 	

+d2+
2

 	

+d2 
2

> 1:
Proof of Case 6. Assume m >  (the case m <  is analogous). Step 1: no deviation
from ( + ; ;) is protable for candidate 1. By construction, 1(s) = 0 for all s, implying that
i1( + ; s1) =  +  for all s1. Since d2 = ;; and voters are risk neutral, i2(d2; s2) =  for all s2.
It follows that the vote share of both candidates are deterministic and perfectly spatial, so that the
vote shares can be computed as the area below 	 in between one of the extremes of the distribution
and ++2 . Then, a simple separation argument shows that, for any  < m,
eb1() =  + : (See
Appendix A for a denition of eb1() ). Since V1( + ; ;) = 1    > 12 , and, by construction,
V1(;; ;) = 12 , it follows that V1(eb1(); ;) > V1(;; ;). Step 2: no deviation from (   ; ;) is protable
for candidate 2. For any d2 6= ;; i2(d2; s2) depends on s2. From Appendix A, it follows that eb2(+ )
takes any of the following three forms: (i) dcase_i2 (+ )  +(+ ); (ii) dcase_ii2 (+ )    ; and
(iii) any dcase_iii2 ( + ) 2 (   ;  + ), since V (d2; d1) is constant for any d2 2 (   ;  + ). From
Appendix A, V2(d
case_i
2 ( + );  + ) = 1   ( + )   12; which as  # 0; converges to 1      12;
V2(d
case_ii
2 ( + );  + ) =
1
2   12 + 14 ; and V2(d
case_iii
2 ( + );  + ) =
1
2   12: It then follows that
V2(d
casei_i
2 (+ ); + )  V2(dcase_iii2 (+ ); + ) for any value of : And V2(dcasei_i2 (+ ); + ) 
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V2(d
case_ii
2 (+); +) if and only ifm > : Becausem > , it must be that eb2(+) = dcasei_i2 (+).
It remains to check the value of the parameters such that V2(;; + ) > V2(eb2(+ ); + ): Because
as  # 0; V2( + ; ;) converges to , candidate 2 will not deviate from ; to eb2( + ) if and only if
 > 1     12, which is equivalent to  > m  14:
Proof of Proposition 12. Assume   m (an analogous argument holds for  > m). Since
candidates are identical, it su¢ ces to check that for, say, candidate 2; V2(;; ;)  V2(b2; ;) for all
b2 2 D, in M(D [ f;g; 1(s); 2(s)). Since d1 = ;; and voters are risk neutral, this is equivalent to
check that, for candidate 2, V2(;; ;)  V2(eb2(); ), inM(D[f;g; 0; 2(s)). Using the characterization
of eb2(d1) (in the main body of the paper), it follows that either eb2(d1) = d1+ +  or eb2(d1) = 1 d1:
We check for what values of the parameters it is true that (i) V (v2(;; ;)) > V (v2( +  + ; ;)) and
(ii) V (v2(;; ;)) > V (v2(1  ; ;)): By construction, V (v2(;; ;)) = 12 : Also,
V (v2( +  + ; ;)) = (1  ) pl + (1     ) pr + 

p2l
ql
+
p2r
qr
  1

: (26)
In M(D [ f;g; 0; 2(s)); for the prole of strategies (;; ;), v2;l = 1    and v2;r = 1      .
Hence, the condition   jv2;r v2;lj4 (in Appendix C) reduces   4 : Plugging in the values of
pl and p

r that correspond to the case   jvr vlj4 (from Appendix C), expression (26) reduces to
V (vc( +  + ; ;)) = 1      1162   12: Then, V (v2(;; ;)) > V (vc( +  + ; ;)) if and only if
1
2 > 1     1162   12, which is equivalent to  > m  12   1162: Since V (v2(1  ; ;)) = 12   12;
the condition V (v2(;; ;)) > V (vc( +  + ; ;)) is trivially satised.
Proof of Proposition 13. Assume   m (the case  > m is symmetric). Step 1: check for
deviations for candidate 1. V (v1(m;m)) = 12 +
1
2: It follows readily from the characterization ofeb1() in Appendix B that V (v1(eb1(m);m))  12 + 12: Then, the only potentially protable deviation
is to d1 = ;: Two possible cases: jm  j >  and jm  j  : If jm  j > , then V (v1(;;m)) =
+m 
2 pl+
+m+
2 pr+

p2l
1
2
+ p
2
r
1
2
  1

: Since v1(;;mjl) = 1  2  m2 + 2 , and v1(;;mjr) = 1  2  m2   2
, the condition   jvr vlj4 (in Appendix C) reduces   4 : Plugging in the values of pl and pr that
correspond to the case   jvr vlj4 (from Appendix C), V (v1(;;m)) = 14 + 12   182 + 1162 2: Then,
V (v1(m;m))  V (vc(;;m)) if and only if 12 + 12 > 14 + 12   182 + 1162 2: This condition is always
satised, since the l.h.s is greater than 12 and the r.h.s is smaller than
1
2 . If jm  j  , then
V (v1(;;m)) =

1  +m 2

pl +
+m+
2 pr +

p2l
1
2
+ p
2
r
1
2
  1

: Substituting the value of pl and p

r that
correspond to the case   jvr vlj4 , we get
V (v1(;;m)) = 1
2
+
1
2
   1
32
+
1
642
+
1
8
   1
8
2   1
162
 +
1
162
2:
Algebraic manipulation shows that V (v1(m;m))  V (v1(;;m)) if and only if   0:5. Since the
latter holds trivially, candidate 1 never nds protable to deviate from (m;m):
Step 2: check for deviations for candidate 2: V (v1(m;m)) = 12  12: It follows readily from the char-
acterization of eb2() in Appendix B that V (v2(eb1(m);m))  12   12: Then, the only potentially prof-
itable deviation is to d2 = ;: Because V (v2(;;m)) = +m2 , it follows that V (v2(m;m))  V (v2(;;m))
if and only if 12   12  +m2 ; which reduces to   m  :
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8.5 Appendix E: Summary Statistics
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev.
NPAT test (dummy) 0.31 - 0.46
TV cost index (U.S. $) 321.9 150 376.1
TV cost index II (10%) (U.S. $) 326.3 156 374.1
TV cost index III (50 %) (U.S. $) 526 406 439.1
Note: TV cost indexes for 2004 constructed based on CPP values, Media Market Guide (2004).
The TV cost indexes correspond to 30 second ads reaching 1% of the marketshouseholds.
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Figure 2: The game as a tree. In the picture, 1 represents candidate 1, 2 represents candidate 2, and
N represents a (fair) Nature. Contrary to the convention, Nature moves last to be consistent with
our proposed interpretation. We have only depicted three branches for Natures move to save space,
but there actually as many branches as elements in S1  S2; namely 4.
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